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ACTIVIST DIRECTORS AND AGENCY COSTS: 
WHAT HAPPENS WHEN AN ACTIVIST 
DIRECTOR GOES ON THE BOARD? 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Robert J. Jackson, Jr., 
Joshua R. Mitts & Robert E. Bishop† 
We develop and apply a new and more rigorous 
methodology by which to measure and understand both 
informed trading and the agency costs of hedge fund 
activism. We use quanti-tative data to show a systematic 
relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund-
nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in 
informed trading in that corpora-tion’s stock (with the 
relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate 
of directors includes a hedge fund em-ployee). This finding 
is important from two different perspec-tives. First, from a 
governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a 
new and potent force in corporate govern-ance. A robust 
debate continues as to whether activist funds reduce the 
agency costs of corporate governance, but this is the first 
attempt to investigate whether activist hedge funds also 
impose new agency costs through widened bid-ask 
spreads and informed trading. Second, although insider trad-
ing is almost universally condemned, it has only been studied 
in individual cases. Using instead a quantitative approach, 
we develop a tool that enables regulators (civil and criminal) to 
identify suspicious trading patterns: both to demonstrate 
such a pattern and to map these new agency costs, we assem-
bled a data set of 475 settlement agreements, between target 
companies and activist funds relating to the appointment of 
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fund-nominated directors, from 2000 to 2015, in order to focus 
on what happens once such a fund-nominated director goes 
on the board. 
Among our principal findings are: 
1. Prevalence of Hedge Fund Employees on Slates.  Ap-
proximately 70% of fund-nominated director slates 
include a hedge fund employee. 
2. Increase in Information Leakage.  Once a fund-nom-
inated director goes on the board, an abrupt in-
crease in “information leakage” follows, with the 
result that the target corporation’s stock price be-
gins to anticipate future public disclosures.  Specif-
ically, we examine some 635,450 Form 8-K’s filed 
by 7,799 publicly traded companies over the period 
of January 1, 2000 to September 30, 2016, and we 
construct a control group for each of the corpora-
tions subject to an activist intervention.  We find 
that firms appointing an activist nominee or nomi-
nees experience a difference-in-differences increase 
in leakage of twenty-five to twenty-seven percentage 
points. 
3. Hedge Funds Versus Other Activists.  We next con-
sider whether post-appointment increases in leak-
age depend on the identity of the activist investors 
(i.e., hedge fund versus other activist investors). We 
find that the leakage effect is clearly driven by 
hedge fund activists (and no other type of activist). 
4. Leakage and Hedge Fund Employees.  We investi-
gate whether leakage increases depend on the iden-
tity of the director appointed to the target firm’s 
board, distinguishing between hedge fund employ-
ees and non-hedge fund employees.  We find that 
the increase in leakage is driven by the appoint-
ment of activist fund employees to the corporate 
board (and not by the appointment of other per-
sons, such as industry professionals). 
5. Leakage and Confidentiality Provisions.  We con-
sider whether post-settlement increases in leakage 
are associated with confidentiality provisions re-
stricting information sharing in the settlement 
agreements.  The majority of settlement agreements 
have no confidentiality provisions, and information 
leakage is concentrated in these cases. 
6. Market Response to Settlement Agreements.  We  
next examine whether the stock market’s response 
to settlement agreements depends on (a) whether a 
hedge fund employee is on the director slate, and (b) 
whether the settlement agreement contains or re-
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fers to a confidentiality provision.  We find that the 
five day CAR is more than twice as high (4.2% vs. 
1.97%) for settlements with only non-employee di-
rectors and also significantly higher (2.02% vs. 
0.42%) for settlements with an explicit restriction 
on information sharing. 
7. Effect on Bid-Ask Spread.  Bid-ask spreads increase 
by statistically meaningful amounts in our treat-
ment group after an activist director gains access to 
the boardroom.  Bid-ask spreads do not widen for 
the control groups.  Further, we find that the in-
creases in bid-ask spreads are concentrated in 
those cases in which (i) a hedge fund employee is 
appointed to the board, or (ii) no confidentiality pro-
vision is referenced in the settlement agreement. 
8. Options Trading.  We find that options trading in-
creases significantly after the appointment of an ac-
tivist director and in a manner consistent with 
informed trading.  Consistent with earlier research 
on informed trading, we find that options traders 
focus on unscheduled Form 8-K filings. 
9. Implications.  The foregoing pattern is most plausi-
bly explained as the product of informed trading. 
Material, nonpublic information appears to be in-
corporated into the market price prior to public dis-
closure.  We reach no conclusions about who is 
trading or its legality in any individual case.  Yet, 
the widened bid-ask spread strongly suggests that 
the market expects such trading, and the much 
more positive market response to director slates 
without a hedge fund employee (or with a confiden-
tiality provision) suggests that the market suspects 
that informed trading is closely associated with the 
appointment of a hedge fund employee to the board. 
10. Hypothesis.  Our data suggests that the ability to 
engage in informed trading may serve as a subsidy 
that inflates the rate of hedge fund activism (pro-
ducing more engagements than if stronger controls 
on information sharing were imposed) and may 
even encourage activists to pursue inefficient en-
gagements.  Further, a potential beneficiary of this 
informed trading may be the “wolf-pack” of activists 
that follow the lead activist in the engagement.  But 
we stop short of attempting to estimate the size of 
such impacts. 
11. Reforms.  We consider and evaluate a variety of pos-
sible reforms that are consistent with an energetic 
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role for hedge fund activism, but that remove (to 
various degrees) the subsidy of informed trading. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Hedge fund activism has dramatically reshaped corporate 
governance—arguably revolutionizing it.  Almost everyone 
agrees with this assessment, but they disagree over whether 
this change is for the better or the worse.  An intense and 
continuing debate has surrounded whether interventions by 
activist hedge funds enhance shareholder value or only create 
short-term pressures that compel corporate managers to sacri-
fice long-term performance.1  This Article, however, will not 
attempt to replough this much-ploughed furrow. 
1 Consensus exists only on the common finding that a filing with the SEC 
(usually of a Schedule 13D) that announces an activist’s position in a publicly 
held company is associated with a positive abnormal stock return. See Alon Brav 
et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance, 63 J. 
activism are contested.  There is some dispute whether this initial stock price 
bump fades when no transaction subsequently materializes.  However, Bebchuk 
and others examined the performance of approximately 2,000 activist targets over 
the five years following these activist’s intervention and find no evidence that the 
FIN. 1729, 1736–37 (2008).  Beyond this point, most empirical conclusions about 
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Instead, our starting point is that, in this new landscape of 
corporate governance, the activist hedge fund has become the 
key intermediary.2  But, as new agents arise, so do new agency 
costs.  This is definitional.3  Unless the interests of the agent 
and the agent’s principal are perfectly aligned, this new agent 
will find ways to exercise its discretion opportunistically and in 
its own interests.  Thus, this Article’s primary goal is to map 
these new agency costs arising from hedge fund activism.  We 
attempt to do so by using a statistically more rigorous method-
ology than has previously been applied to either corporate gov-
initial stock price gain fades. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The 
Long-Term Effects of Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1085 (2015). 
Nonetheless, Cremers and others contend that Bebchuk’s findings are largely the 
product of selection bias and the failure to use a proper control group.  They 
contend that, once control groups are used, a regression to the mean can be seen 
in the subsequent performance of activist targets. See K.J. Martijn Cremers et al., 
Hedge Fund Activism and Long-Term Value, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2693231 
[https://perma.cc/DRZ4-CFBS] (Dec. 19, 2018). Other scholars have rejected the 
methodology used in those studies finding that activism results in increases in 
shareholder value and reported that, under their revised approach, the long-term 
returns to activism are “insignificantly different from zero.” See Ed deHaan, David 
F. Larcker, and Charles McClure, Long Term Economic Consequences of Hedge 
Fund Activist Interventions, https://ssrn.com/abstract=3260095 (Oct. 3, 2018). 
This Article takes no position on this continuing dispute.  Many have also raised 
the claim that short-term pressures compel managers to abandon long-term in-
vestments, particularly in research and development, that would have proven 
profitable, with the result that activism thus produces a negative externality in 
reduced aggregate investment in research and development. See John C. Coffee, 
Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on 
Corporate Governance, 41 J. CORP. L. 545, 545 (2016); Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who 
Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund 
Activism and Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 
1870 (2017).  But again, others contend that despite declines in research and 
development expenditures following activist interventions, target companies 
nonetheless experience an improvement in innovation efficiency as measured by 
patent counts and citations. See Alon Brav et al., How Does Hedge Fund Activism 
Reshape Corporate Innovation?, 130 J. FIN. ECON. 237, 237 (2018). 
2 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordan, The Agency Costs of Agency 
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 863, 863 (2013). 
3 The term “agency costs,” first defined by Jensen and Meckling, refers to the 
costs that arise because of the use by a principal of an agent.  These costs include 
(1) the costs of opportunistic behavior by the agent (such as when the agent places 
his own self-interest over that of the principal); (2) the costs to the principal of 
monitoring the agent; and (3) the “bonding” costs incurred by the agent to induce 
the principal to rely on the agent. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure, 
3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976).  Others have coined the term “principal costs” to 
refer to costs imposed on the corporate entity by the principal, such as where 
there is inter-shareholder conflict. See Zohar Goshen & Richard Squire, Principal 
Costs: A New Theory for Corporate Law and Governance, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 767, 
767 (2017).  This is applicable here also, as the other shareholders may object 
that decisions by the lead activist were self-interested. 
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ernance or white collar crime, which, we hope, will serve as a 
model for future research in these areas. 
Three recent developments (on which this Article will focus) 
suggest that agency costs are significant and increasing.  First, 
hedge funds are succeeding in placing their nominees on cor-
porate boards, and in 2016, netted a record 131 board seats for 
their nominees.4  Second, the vast majority of these seats were 
resolved through private agreements (and without a share-
holder vote), and the largest and most sophisticated institu-
tional investors have begun to complain that this private 
settlement process effectively disenfranchises them.5  These 
objectors characteristically differ from the activist fund that 
initiates the campaign in that they are much larger, more diver-
sified (often highly indexed), and have a substantially longer 
time horizon.  Thus, an important issue is whether the new 
private settlement process infringes basic norms of share-
holder democracy. 
Third, in the course of studying this private settlement 
process, we assembled a data set of 475 private settlement 
agreements, extending from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 
2015.  Analyzing these agreements, we discovered a previously 
unnoticed pattern: when an activist-nominated director or di-
4 In 2016, activists ran some 149 campaigns to secure board representation 
and netted a record 131 board seats. LAZARD, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM IN 
2016, at 1 (2017) [hereinafter LAZARD (2016)].  In 2017, the number of seats won 
fell to 100, but the number of campaigns rose to 193 and the amount of capital 
invested by activists soared to a record $62 billion, as activists took on much 
larger companies. See LAZARD’S SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY GROUP, 2017 ACTIVISM YEAR 
IN REVIEW, at 1, 5 [hereinafter LAZARD (2017)].  Most recently, in the first quarter of 
2018, 73 new campaigns were initiated by activists (the highest quarterly level of 
activity “on record” according to Lazard), and some 65 board seats were won in the 
first quarter of 2018 (which was “well ahead” of comparable periods in 2016 and 
2017). See LAZARD SHAREHOLDER ADVISORY GROUP, REVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
– Q1 2018, at 1 [hereinafter LAZARD (2018)].  By all measures, activism is surging. 
5 The three largest institutional shareholders are BlackRock, Inc., State 
Street Global Advisors, and Vanguard, which collectively hold 18.4% of the stock 
of companies in the S&P 500 index. LAZARD (2018), supra note 4, at 8.  Each of 
these three institutions is highly diversified and tends to be a “permanent share-
holder,” thus differing from activist hedge funds that hold shares for shorter 
periods.  Each has repeatedly objected in letters to the CEOs of major corpora-
tions about the short-term vision of activist hedge funds. See infra notes 93–97 
and accompanying text.  They have also contended that private settlements be-
tween the activist fund and corporate management exclude them from any mean-
ingful voice in the selection of the board.  For the fullest statement of this view, see 
Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements, STATE STREET 
GLOBAL ADVISORS (Oct. 10, 2016), https://www.ssga.com/investment-topics/envi-
ronmental-social-governance/2016/Protecting-Long-Term-Shareholder-Inter-
ests-in-Activist-Engagements.pdf [https://perma.cc/SAJ7-N3RV].  For a fuller 
explanation of their critique, see infra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
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rectors goes on a target corporation’s board pursuant to a set-
tlement agreement, a pattern of “information leakage” begins. 
That is, after such a director is appointed (or even given ob-
server status at board meetings), the stock price of the target 
corporation begins to anticipate future public disclosures, 
moving up or down prior to (but in the same direction as that 
caused by) the eventual public disclosure.  Similarly, the bid-
ask spread in the corporation’s stock price widens—both in 
relation to the stock’s prior history and to a control group of 
similar firms.  We also find a significant pattern of options trad-
ing in advance of new announcements by the target corpora-
tion on Form 8-K.  The most plausible explanation for this 
pattern is informed trading.  Somehow, material, nonpublic in-
formation is being incorporated into the stock’s price, and the 
widened spread reflects the market’s anticipation of informed 
trading (which causes experienced traders to widen their 
spreads defensively).  Whether or not this informed trading is 
unlawful, it represents an agency cost that the other share-
holders bear. 
To underscore the importance of both these findings (that 
private settlement agreements may be preempting shareholder 
elections and that informed trading seems to increase in the 
wake of activist interventions), one should understand that, in 
2016, activists won a record number of board seats, but 95% of 
these seats were obtained through private settlement negotia-
tions, not proxy contests.6 
At present, most of the academic literature on hedge fund 
activism tends to reflect an optimistic view under which activ-
ists are seen as desirable agents of change, who intentionally 
invest in underperforming companies to organize the other 
shareholders to support their proposals (which usually seek to 
increase leverage and shareholder payout, trim waste, and/or 
change senior management).7  So viewed, the process may 
seem a model of shareholder democracy, as the activists make 
proposals, managements respond, and the balance of the 
shareholders (who are largely sophisticated institutional inves-
6 LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1.  This 95% figure is in sharp contrast to 
the earlier pattern.  Two years earlier, in 2014, 34% of the board seats won by 
activists were won in actual proxy contests, not private settlements. Id.  Thus, the 
shift towards private settlements is accelerating.  In 2017, this rate fell to 86% 
(i.e., 86 of the 100 seats won that year were as the result of private settlements). 
LAZARD (2017), supra note 4, at 5. 
7 For this view, see Gilson & Gordon, supra note 2, at 876 (emphasizing that 
institutional investors, without the leadership of the activist fund, would remain 
passive and silent). 
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tors) decide the issue.  From this perspective, the result is gov-
ernance by referendum, with a well-informed debate, followed 
by a vote.  All that is new here is the appearance of an en-
trepreneurial intermediary (the activist hedge fund), who 
searches for underperforming companies, makes proposals, 
and lobbies the other shareholders, who hold the balance of 
power, to act in their mutual self-interest. 
But a more skeptical view of activism may be necessary 
because the process does not actually work this simply.8  In 
reality, there are relatively few shareholder votes on activists’ 
proposals or director nominees.  Instead, the activists and 
management typically settle their disputes through private ne-
gotiations, with the activists sometimes receiving private bene-
fits not available to the other shareholders.9  Why does 
management settle rather than fight (and thus let all share-
holders decide)?  Our answer is that the CEO’s job is imperiled, 
unless he or she settles.10  With its human capital locked into 
the company, senior management of a company “engaged” by 
activists has every reason to behave in a risk-averse fashion. 
Additionally, drawn-out proxy fights introduce uncertainty into 
the company and divert managerial time.  For both reasons, 
the vast majority of the directors placed on the board as the 
result of activist pressure is appointed through privately nego-
tiated settlements, thus allowing management to avoid the risk 
of a proxy contest.11  Large institutional investors have begun 
to object vocally to this private settlement process.12  Regarding 
themselves as the company’s “permanent shareholders,” these 
institutions assert that de facto power has shifted to short-term 
activists who often have a distinctly different agenda from 
theirs. 
8 For such a more skeptical view, see Coffee & Palia, supra note 1, at 562–68. 
9 See infra subpart II.A. 
10 Lazard’s Shareholder Advisory Group reports that, since 2013, annualized 
CEO turnover at activist targets has averaged 23% compared to 12% for non-
targets. LAZARD’S  SHAREHOLDER  ADVISORY  GROUP, REVIEW OF  SHAREHOLDER  ACTIV-
ISM—3Q 2017, at 1 (2017).  For the even higher rate of turnover if activist nomi-
nees go onto the board, see infra note 47 and accompanying text (reporting study 
by FTI Consulting showing that the CEO turnover rate rises to 55.1% over two 
years if activists place one or more nominees on the board).  Further evidence of 
management’s risk aversion lies in the fact that when there actually is a proxy 
contest, management usually wins.  In 2016, Lazard found that activists won in 
only 38% of proxy contests. LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1.  This suggests that 
management prefers to settle, except in cases where it is highly confident that it 
can win. 
11 See LAZARD (2018), supra note 4, at 1. 
12 See infra notes 90–95 and accompanying text. 
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Viewed from this perspective, one does not see the simple 
democracy of the Swiss canton, but instead a process of 
backroom deal-making reminiscent of a political “machine.” 
The distance between these two perspectives largely turns on 
whether private settlements may result in different outcomes 
than shareholder elections do. 
These twin concerns—the impact of activist interventions 
on shareholder democracy and the pervasiveness of informed 
trading once an activist goes on the board—may seem unre-
lated, but they are both examples of agency costs.  We believe 
these costs are significant and that they have not yet been 
seriously examined.  Still, we must emphasize at the outset 
that we do not assert that shareholder activism is fatally 
flawed, and we believe feasible reforms are easily within reach. 
Nor do we doubt that rational investors will often want insur-
gents (including hedge fund activists) to challenge corporate 
managements.  All that we insist is that the loyalty of this new 
activist agent cannot be automatically assumed. 
In this light, two other findings of our study need to be 
emphasized.  First, we find that the stock price pattern from 
which we detect information leakage and widened bid-ask 
spreads is particularly pronounced in cases where one of the 
activist-nominated directors is a hedge fund employee.  Put 
more simply, increases in information leakage occur more often 
and to a greater degree at companies where a hedge fund em-
ployee, rather than a former industry executive, joins the 
board.  This seems plausible because hedge fund employees 
live in a world of traders (and thus have more opportunities to 
pass such information, either by way of a quid pro quo ex-
change or in casual gossip). 
Second, we find that there is also a strong relationship 
between this pattern of information leakage and whether the 
private settlement agreement seriously attempts to restrict the 
use of confidential information acquired by the activist-nomi-
nated directors.  Most agreements are in fact silent on this 
point, and others seem to tacitly permit information sharing.13 
These findings lead us to advance three hypotheses. First, 
the ability to engage in informed trading based on access to 
material, nonpublic information may provide a subsidy to 
hedge fund activism.  By definition, a subsidy increases the 
volume or level of the activity subsidized.  Here, that means 
that, on the margin, there may be more activist “engagements” 
13 See infra notes 53–59 and accompanying text. 
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and more activist-appointed directors under a system that en-
ables activists to gain access to nonpublic information than 
under one that more closely restricts such access.  Second, 
providing access to such information may be the social cement 
that holds together a loose coalition of hedge funds (popularly 
called a “wolf pack”) that supports the lead activist’s efforts to 
compel corporate managements to accept its proposals.  Third, 
activist engagements that propose an inefficient (or at least 
highly debatable) change in the target’s business model may 
still succeed (or at least capture board seats) because of the 
desire of these allies of the activist to continue to receive access 
to material, nonpublic information in return for their support 
(even if they doubt the wisdom of the lead activist’s specific 
proposal).  In short, the corporation risks inefficient changes in 
its policies or business model when the activist can reward its 
allies with access to material, nonpublic information.  We em-
phasize that these are hypotheses, not findings, and they will 
be elaborated and defended in more detail later in this Article. 
In fairness, one qualification is necessary at the outset: we 
do not assert that any specific persons—activist-appointed di-
rectors, hedge fund employees, or allies in other hedge funds— 
have engaged in unlawful insider trading.  Inferences of illegal-
ity cannot be drawn from our data, standing alone.  But it is 
clear that informed trading has occurred and someone is bene-
fitting.  In any event, even if the sharing of material, nonpublic 
information among investment professionals were not illegal, it 
would still represent an agency cost for investors and a per-
verse subsidy for activism that distorts the capital markets. 
In this Article, we present empirical evidence of the pres-
ence of these agency costs.  Using a novel database of 475 
settlement agreements between activists and target companies 
over a fifteen-year period, we systematically study activist set-
tlements and the directors appointed pursuant to those agree-
ments.14  Our study differs from other studies in several ways. 
First, we consider settlement agreements through the end of 
2015.  The period 2011–2015 saw a substantial increase in the 
number of settlements with activist investors, and the first 
14 We are not the first to study settlement agreements with activist investors, 
but we are the first to examine closely the market reaction to them and to special 
characteristics of these arguments.  For an earlier study, see Lucian A. Bebchuk 
et al., Dancing with Activists, https://ssrn.com/abstract=2948869 [https:// 
perma.cc/P2NR-XNRB] (Last modified Nov. 27, 2017).  They focus on the effect of 
these agreements on the target firm’s governance, including board turnover, CEO 
turnout, payout policy and operational performance. 
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public criticisms by diversified institutional investors of activist 
behavior. 
Second, we identify some critical factors in settlement 
agreements that have not previously been examined (or even 
noticed).  In particular, we compare the five-day cumulative 
abnormal return (“CAR”) to settlements with and without at 
least one hedge fund employee being added to the board of 
directors pursuant to the agreement.  The average five-day CAR 
is more than twice as high (4.2% vs. 1.9%) for settlements with 
only non-employee directors,15 and this is consistent with our 
findings (described below) about possible agency costs of hav-
ing hedge fund employees on the board.  Similarly, the average 
five-day CAR is several times higher (2.2% vs. 0.42%) for settle-
ments with an explicit rule on information sharing in either the 
settlement agreement itself or a separate confidentiality agree-
ment.16  That activists continue to place hedge fund employees 
on boards and to resist rules on information sharing against 
the market’s strong preference suggests that some stronger 
motivation leads activist funds to disregard the market’s 
preference. 
To summarize, our main empirical finding is that the ap-
pointment of fund-nominated directors causes material infor-
mation regarding the firm and its operations to become more 
“leaky”; that is, more of that information makes its way into the 
company’s stock price prior to the public disclosure of that 
information than in the case of our control group of similarly-
situated firms.17  The increased leakiness is strongly associ-
ated with the appointment of directors who are also employees 
of the activist investor as opposed to the industry experts typi-
cally appointed to the target’s board pursuant to an activist 
settlement.  Moreover, leakage is concentrated in settlements 
without any explicit rule on information sharing in either the 
settlement agreement itself or a separate confidentiality agree-
ment.  We show that bid-ask spreads grow significantly as a 
result of the appointment of these kinds of activist directors, 
providing further evidence as to the agency cost inherent in 
these settlements.18 
15 See infra notes 62–63 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
17 As we show formally in the Theoretical Appendix, the pattern of this leak-
age follows dynamic behavioral models of criminal wrongdoing: that is, the magni-
tude of our leakage finding decreases over time, as the probability of detecting 
trading on leaked information increases. 
18 See infra subpart II.G.  For a review of the literature describing previous 
empirical work documenting the benefits associated with hedge fund activism, see 
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None of this implies that hedge fund activism is inherently 
corrupt or misguided.  But to the extent that hedge fund activ-
ists present themselves as the champion of all the sharehold-
ers, there may be a need for greater oversight of this imperfect 
champion. 
A roadmap for this Article is now in order.  After this intro-
duction, this Article will examine in Part I the private settle-
ment process surrounding hedge fund “engagements” to show 
how it differs from a simple democratic model.  Part II will then 
turn to an empirical study of the potential agency costs that are 
inherent in this new process.  Again, this mapping is under-
taken not to demonstrate that the shareholder activist must be 
deterred, but more to suggest where greater controls and trans-
parency are needed.  Then, Part III will turn to potential re-
forms.  Here, two issues stand out: (1) Should other 
shareholders be enabled to participate in, or object to, these 
private settlements when they substantially change the compo-
sition of the board? and (2) How can the agency costs associ-
ated with this new activism best be minimized? This Article will 
then offer some conclusions. 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of 
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 40 (2012).  We acknowledge that we 
are not the first to examine the implications of activist shareholders’ access to 
material nonpublic information.  Collin-Dufresne and Fos use an extensive 
dataset of trades in the target company’s stock before the activist’s presence is 
disclosed to consider whether standard measures of adverse selection reflect such 
trading. See Pierre Collin-Dufresne & Vyacheslav Fos, Moral Hazard, Informed 
Trading, and Stock Prices, (THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH, Working 
Paper 19619, Nov. 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19619 [https:// 
perma.cc/6SZV-J9BL].  But that is a very different focus than ours.  Federal law 
requires activists to disclose their stakes to the public within ten days of acquiring 
greater than 5% ownership of any class of the target company’s stock.  As one of 
us has shown in previous work, activists often use a substantial amount of this 
ten-day window before disclosing their stake. See Lucian A. Bebchuk et al., Pre-
Disclosure Accumulations by Activist Investors: Evidence and Policy, 39 J. CORP. L. 
1, 23 (2013).  In the Collin-Dufresne and Fos study, the activist’s presence, itself, 
was the relevant material nonpublic information.  Here, we examine the effects of 
the appointment of activist directors on how fundamental information about a 
material corporate event makes its way into stock prices after the activist’s inter-
vention.  We note that in the setting in Collin-Dufresne and Fos, the activist 
creates the information—that is, the activist’s own intervention.  By contrast, in 
our setting, the material corporate event occurs exogenously, and the activist and 
associated traders profit from information created by (and arguably misappropri-
ated from) the corporate issuer. 
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I 
BACKGROUND AND THEORY 
This Article’s focus on the agency costs of hedge fund activ-
ism draws upon a new scholarly literature that has distin-
guished “vertical” agency costs from “horizontal” agency 
costs.19  The classic “vertical” costs were those associated with 
holding management accountable.  But, as scholars studying 
venture capital have noted, conflicts can also arise among dif-
ferent groups of shareholders who acquired their stock at dif-
ferent times and with different rights.  Some shareholders may 
be able to act opportunistically with respect to the others.  Sim-
ilarly, as the “vertical” agency costs of corporate governance are 
minimized and management is made more accountable, activ-
ists at public corporations may increasingly be able to act op-
portunistically with respect to two other groups: (1) Other 
shareholders who (for various reasons) have traditionally been 
passive and (2) Stakeholders (in particular, creditors and em-
ployees).  In particular, this Article will assert that a “horizon-
tal” conflict has arisen between activists (who tend to be short-
term shareholders) and indexed institutional investors (who 
tend to be long-term investors and regard themselves as the 
company’s “permanent shareholders”). 
As this conflict intensifies, the role of management 
changes.  In the past, managements and boards of directors at 
public companies have professed that their core responsibility 
was to balance the interests of all stakeholders.20  The larger 
the company, the more likely that its management would take 
such a stance.  But this balancing (to the extent that it in fact 
19 See Robert P. Bartlett, III, Venture Capital, Agency Costs, and the False 
Dichotomy of the Corporation, 54 UCLA L. REV. 37, 42–45 (2006); Simone M. Sepe, 
Corporate Agency Problems and Dequity Contracts, 36 J. CORP. L. 113, 129 (2010). 
This concept is similar to the idea of “principal costs” developed by Professors 
Goshen and Squire. See Goshen & Squire, supra note 3, at 767.  For our pur-
poses, differences in nomenclature are not important. 
20 Margaret Blair has correctly observed that: “Throughout the middle of the 
twentieth century through at least the 1970s, most scholars of corporate law, as 
well as legal and business practitioners, accepted and were comfortable with the 
idea that boards of directors have to play a balancing role.”  Margaret M. Blair, 
Boards of Directors as Mediating Hierarchs, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 297, 315 (2015). 
Indeed, in 1981, the Business Roundtable published a “Statement on Corporate 
Responsibility” that insisted that boards were obligated to balance “different con-
stituent interests.” See BUSINESS ROUNDTABLE, STATEMENT ON CORPORATE RESPONSI-
BILITY 75 (1981). See also Harwell Wells, ‘Corporation Law is Dead’: Heroic 
Managerialism, the Cold War, and the Puzzle of Corporation Law at the Height of 
the American Century, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 305, 325–23 (2013) (discussing man-
agement’s seemingly public role, and responsibilities to various stakeholders, 
including stockholders, employees, and customers). 
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occurred) may have been at least partially a product of high 
agency costs that sheltered management from shareholder 
pressure.  Once that protection is removed and management 
loses the discretion it once had, management and the board 
may come under greater pressure to transfer wealth from credi-
tors and employees to shareholders.  Indeed, abundant evi-
dence exists that hedge fund activism has cost creditors 
significantly and systematically.21  In addition, some evidence 
suggests that shareholder pressure, organized and directed by 
activist hedge funds, may cause the corporation to act in a 
more risk-accepting manner and contrary to broadly accepted 
public policies.22  As a result, the tendency to view activists 
automatically as the “good” guys, and management as the 
21 See, e.g., Surendranath Jory, Thanh Ngo & Jurica Susnjara, The Effect of 
Shareholder Activism on Bondholders and Stockholders, 66 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 
328, 328 (2017) (finding that “activists’ demands cause a significant decline in 
bond returns, and affect long-term bonds the most”); Felix Zhiyu Feng, Qiping Xu 
& Heqing Zhu, Caught in the Crossfire: How the Threat of Hedge Fund Activism 
Affects Creditors, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=271 
6929 [https://perma.cc/RRX4-BC7G] (last modified Aug. 20, 2018) (observing 
that in threatened industries, firms with an ex ante high likelihood of hedge fund 
activism experience significant losses in bondholder wealth); April Klein & Eman-
uel Zur, The Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on the Target Firm’s Existing Bond-
holders, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 1735, 1735 (2011) (finding that the bond returns from 
ten days before to one day after the filing of a 13D are negative (-3.9%), that the 
average abnormal bond returns for one year after the filing date are an additional -
4.5%, and that the abnormal stock returns are negatively related to the abnormal 
bond returns at both the short-term and long-term intervals). 
22 To give just two examples, there is evidence that hedge fund activism is (1) 
negatively affecting board diversity and resulting in less women and minorities 
serving on boards, and (2) compelling some energy companies to use “dirty” en-
ergy and shelve projects to shift to “clean” energy.  For the impact on diversity, see 
Andrew Borek, Zachary Friesner & Patrick McGurn, The Impact of Shareholder 
Activism on Board Refreshment Trends at S&P 1500 Firms, IRRC INST., https:// 
irrcinstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/FINAL-Activism-and-Board-Re-
freshment-Trends-Report-Aug-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/N6ZB-PS94] (detail-
ing a study by the ISS and the IRRC).  With respect to the impact on the 
environment, the best example is the campaign led in 2017 by Elliott Manage-
ment, a prominent hedge fund, to force NRG Energy, Inc., the nation’s second-
largest electricity producer, to dispose of its renewable energy assets (basically 
solar and wind power assets) and return to the use of coal (which was cheaper). 
See Ed Crooks, Activists Clash Over Direction for NRG Energy, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 4, 
2017), https://www.ft.com/content/89417ba2-1d3e-11e7-a454-ab04428977f9 
[https://perma.cc/96UK-75SU]; Diane Cardwell & Alexandra Stevenson, NRG, a 
Power Company Leaning Green, Faces Activist Challenge, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/business/dealbook/nrg-elliott-
management-climate.html [https://perma.cc/A7HK-48YJ].  Eventually, NRG 
gave in, sold its renewable energy assets, and returned to “dirty” energy. See 
Russell Gold, NRG to Sell Assets, Slash Costs, Bowing to Activist Pressure, WALL 
ST. J. (July 12, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/nrg-to-sell-assets-slash-
costs-bowing-to-activist-pressure-1499868712 [https://perma.cc/VUD9-2SPD]. 
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“bad” guys, when a conflict between them arises, is becoming 
increasingly dated. 
A. The Private Settlement Process 
Democracy relies on voting. But shareholder democracy 
today turns on private negotiations between activists and man-
agement.  To illustrate, in 2016, Lazard counted some 149 
campaigns initiated by activist shareholders in that year to 
obtain board representation, and it found that these cam-
paigns had won a record of 131 board seats in 2016.23  But 
95% of these seats were obtained through settlement negotia-
tions.24  In the relatively few cases that did go to a shareholder 
vote, management generally won,25 suggesting that manage-
ment settled whenever they saw a serious risk of losing and 
contested the activists’ demands only when management was 
confident of victory (or could not strike an acceptable deal). 
Another study by the State Street Global Advisors 
(“SSGA”), a major institutional money manager, confirms La-
zard’s findings.  Surveying companies with market capitaliza-
tions above $500 million (i.e., mid-sized companies and up), 
SSGA finds that less than 10% of the board seats conceded in 
both 2015 and 2016 shifted through a contested proxy elec-
tion.26  Instead, private negotiations dominated, and this trend 
is increasing.  SSGA finds that, in 2014, 34% of board seats 
won by activists were obtained through actual proxy elections, 
which is in marked contrast to the 10% rate in 2016 and im-
plies that in the recent past, management was more prepared 
than today to fight a proxy contest.27  Put simply, management 
today seems increasingly risk averse, probably because a de-
feat in an election contest might discredit it and lead to its 
eventual ouster.  Today, in a negotiated settlement, manage-
ment (and its public relations professionals) can at least seek to 
present the outcome in the light most favorable to itself. 
Skilled at spin control, management would rather settle than 
fight. 
23 LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1.  This 2017 study finds that the number 
of activist campaigns was down in 2016 (by 17%) from 2015, but that the number 
of board seats won (131) was an all-time high, suggesting that activists are be-
coming more successful. Id. 
24 Id. 
25 In 2016, Lazard found that activists had a “win rate” in actual proxy con-
tests of only 38%. Id. at 1. 
26 Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements, supra 
note 5, at 1. 
27 Id. 
Most Board seats Obtained2 
2016 
Activist # of Board Seats W on Avg. Mkt Cap. of Targets1 
Starboard Value 21 $10,267 
Elliott 12 47,026 2 
Icahn 9 30,105 3 
Engaged Capital 8 773 8 
JANA 6,314 5 
Pershing Square 6 19,423 19 
Glenview 4 2,300 
Altimeter/PAR 17,313 
Barington 1,120 13 
Lucus (Red Alder) 671 
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The activists leading these campaigns are a concentrated 
group of repeat players, with the table below showing that ten 
well-known activists won 76 seats—or a clear majority of the 
131 seats won by activists in 2016:28 
TABLE A 
The majority of the seats filled by activists go to persons 
resembling traditional independent directors, but Lazard found 
in 2016, that 27% of contested board seats went to employees 
of the activist fund.29  This statistic is important for a number 
of reasons, including that there appears to be greater informa-
tion leakage when hedge fund employees are placed on the 
board (as later discussed). 
On balance, the rate of hedge fund activism is increasing. 
Although the number of activist campaigns fell somewhat in 
2016, the actual number of seats won by activists increased.30 
The even more significant statistic may be the number of new 
entrants into this field.  Lazard found that 37 activist investors 
initiated activist campaigns for the first time in 2016.31  This 
increase suggests that these first-time activists saw profits to 
be made from the activism and have joined the parade. 
As earlier noted, activist campaigns generally result in a 
settlement, which is usually embodied in a settlement agree-
ment.  These agreements, which are typically (but not always) 
28 LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 4.  Elliott initiated the most campaigns (13), 
but won fewer seats than Starboard Value. Id. 
29 Id. at 1.  Even this low 27% rate allows activists who are proposing a slate 
of candidates (usually between 1 and 4) to include one hedge fund employee.  As 
we later find, approximately 70% of the slates proposed by activists in our data set 
include at least one hedge fund employee. See infra Table 1 (finding that 331 
activist employees have been appointed to boards and that 69.8% of the nominee 
slates in our sample included at least one hedge fund employee). 
30 LAZARD (2016), supra note 4, at 1. 
31 Id. 
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filed with the SEC, have seldom been studied.  Professor Lucian 
Bebchuk and several colleagues recently released one large-
scale study,32 but the study goes only until 2011, and much 
has changed since then.  Typically, these settlement agree-
ments address a number of topics, including board composi-
tion, standstill provisions, expense reimbursement for the 
activist, “non-disparagement” provisions, and, possibly, confi-
dentiality provisions (which may or may not restrict the new 
director or director–nominee from sharing information learned 
at board meetings with others, including the hedge fund). 
Such provisions, as next discussed, raise the possibility that 
the hedge fund activist may receive benefits not available to 
other shareholders. 
A principal conclusion of the Bebchuk study was that 
these agreements do not address the business operations or 
policies of the corporation, but rather, focus only on the com-
position of the board.33  Bebchuk and his colleagues conclude 
that this shows the efficiency of “incomplete contracting.”34 
Those more experienced in corporate law would recognize that 
there is a simpler (if theoretically less elegant) explanation for 
this focus: directors, as fiduciaries, cannot contract away their 
discretion.  As many cases have held, a contract binding the 
director, for example, to vote for increased dividends or a share 
buyback would be unenforceable.35  Instead, the settlement 
agreement must focus on what can be agreed upon: namely, 
how shareholders will vote for directors and which directors 
will agree to resign.  “Incomplete contracting,” at least as an 
explanation for the structure of settlement agreements, works 
better in the hothouse of academia than in the real world. 
In any event, it is clear that, in a high majority of settle-
ment agreements, new directors are added to the board, usu-
ally through an expansion of the board’s size.36  According to 
32 Bebchuk et al., supra note 14. 
33 Id. at 4. 
34 Id. at 14–17. 
35 For early leading cases, see Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick 
Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174 (1948); McQuade v. Stoneham, 263 N.Y. 323 (1934). 
New York does permit closely held corporations to opt out of this rule by a charter 
provision, but there is no exception applicable to publicly held firms. See N.Y. 
BUS. CORP. LAW § 620(b) (Consol. 2018). 
36 The study by Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues finds that new direc-
tors are added in 87.4% of the settlements they surveyed and some incumbent 
directors leave the board in 40.77% of these settlements.  Bebchuk et al., supra 
note 14, at 21.  Thus, the board will typically need to be expanded, which can 
ordinarily be done by bylaw or board resolution if the corporate charter so 
authorizes. 
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the Bebchuk study, the median number of directors so added 
is two (although, in at least a few recent cases, majority slates 
of directors nominated by activists have been elected, giving 
the activist fund de facto control).37  The only other provision 
that is nearly universal is a standstill provision.38 
Inevitably, these settlement negotiations provide opportu-
nities for self-dealing by the activist, whose interests can con-
flict with those of the other shareholders.  To give a well-known 
example, Sotheby’s, the art auction house, was engaged in 
2014 by Third Point LLC, a leading activist hedge fund, 
founded by Daniel S. Loeb, one of the highest profile hedge 
fund activists.  Third Point commenced a proxy fight seeking to 
place three directors on Sotheby’s board, but, on the eve of the 
shareholder meeting (just before the voting outcome would 
have been announced), Third Point settled in part for a $10 
million payment by Sotheby’s as reimbursement of Third 
Point’s expenses.39  Because Sotheby’s, itself, reported that it 
had incurred expenses of only $5.7 million in opposing Third 
Point’s campaign, this payment of $10 million to Third Point 
surprised observers and arguably may have been overly gener-
ous.40  To be sure, Third Point also negotiated the appointment 
of the three directors that it had originally sought, but the 
question remains: was anything traded for this $10 million 
payment?  No conclusion is expressed here, because the rele-
vant point is only that the interests of Third Point and the other 
37 In the Bebchuk study, the median number added to the board was two. Id. 
at 17.  Still, there is high variation, and the Bebchuk study finds that in 17 cases, 
the number appointed was four or more. Id.  In 2016, well after the 2011 end date 
of the Bebchuk study, Mantle Ridge, an activist fund, elected a majority slate of 
directors to the board of CSX Corporation and brought in a new CEO, even though 
Mantle Ridge held only around a 5% stake in CSX. See infra note 61 and accom-
panying text. 
38 The Bebchuk study also finds that a “standstill” provision is “almost uni-
versal.”  Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 6.  It further observes that there can be 
two types of standstill provisions: (1) a limitation on share ownership by the 
activist, and (2) a “corporate governance standstill” under which the solicitations 
of proxies or other actions are halted. Id. at 6.  Although we find that standstill 
provisions are common, we also find that they do not typically restrict open-
market trading by the activist fund.  Often, they are silent on this point, or they 
may specify a maximum ceiling that the activist cannot cross, but which is above 
its current ownership level.  Generally, the standstill provision focuses more on 
precluding a proxy contest or further board nominations by the activist or its 
allies. See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text. 
39 See Alexandra Stevenson, Sotheby’s to Reimburse Loeb $10 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 7, 2014), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/05/07/sothebys-to-
reimburse-loeb-10-million/ [https://perma.cc/64WH-VZ5V]. 
40 Id. 
2019] ACTIVIST DIRECTORS AND AGENCY COSTS 399 
shareholders could conflict.  A tradeoff between management 
and the activist in such a setting is easy to imagine. 
The costs incurred by activists in campaigns for board rep-
resentation are growing.  In the recent and closely contested 
campaign by the Trian Fund to place Nelson Peltz, its founder, 
on the Proctor & Gamble (“P&G”) board, Trian estimated its 
expected costs at $25 million, but acknowledged that they 
could run higher.41  Had P&G’s management recognized that 
Trian would win this proxy fight, P&G might have sought a 
private settlement with Trian that reimbursed some or all of 
Trian’s expenses.  This, of course, raises the issue of what P&G 
might have asked for in return.42 
Other conflicts also inevitably exist.  When the hedge fund 
designates a director or directors (some of whom may be hedge 
fund employees), it will typically remain in close contact with 
its appointed directors and will likely obtain material, nonpub-
lic information from them.43  Potentially, the hedge fund could 
use that information itself, or it could pass it onto allies.  This 
behavior, depending on its facts, may or may not be unlawful 
under the federal securities laws or under Delaware law, but 
regardless, it is an agency cost to the extent it injures the 
corporation or widens the bid-ask spread.  This issue of legality 
will be delayed until later, but the potential conflict could not 
be clearer. 
41 This estimate was made by Trian in its proxy statement, which conceded 
that actual costs could prove higher. See Chris Isidore & David Goldman, Procter 
& Gamble declares victory in expensive proxy fight, CNN MONEY (Oct. 10, 2017), 
http://money.cnn.com.2017/10/10/new/companies/procter-gamble-proxy-
fight/index.html [https://perma.cc/XX57-PRJ9]. 
42 There are many things that corporate management might want in return 
for reimbursement, including: (1) a standstill agreement under which the activist 
agrees not to buy more stock or launch any proxy fight, and (2) a non-disparage-
ment agreement under which the activist agrees not to criticize management 
publicly.  Both are common provisions in settlement agreements. 
43 Delaware law does impose a duty of confidentiality on directors. See, e.g., 
Shocking Techs., Inc. v. Kosowsky, No. 7164-VCN, 2012 WL 4482838 (Del. Ch. 
Oct. 1, 2012), vacated, 2015 WL 3455210 (Del. Ch. May 29, 2015) (finding direc-
tor breached duty of loyalty by providing confidential information to investor); 
Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d. 125 (Del. Ch. 1969) (allowing inspection 
of books and records, and limited disclosure so long as it does not breach direc-
tor’s duty of confidentiality).  Still, a respected Delaware Vice Chancellor has 
recently opined that “directors are on solid ground when resisting confidentiality 
agreements” and probably may share information learned at board meetings with 
the hedge fund that nominated them and with related colleagues. See J. Travis 
Laster & Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 
BUS. L. 33, 48–51 (2014).  As later discussed, such sharing may result in broad 
information leakage. 
400 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:381 
A final area where there may be a “horizontal” conflict be-
tween the interests of the activist and the other shareholders 
involves the choice and agenda of the new directors.  Diversi-
fied institutional shareholders, possibly holding even more 
stock, might prefer different directors with very different objec-
tives.  Recently, BlackRock, Inc., the world’s largest investment 
manager, the Vanguard Group, another of the world’s largest 
investment managers, and SSGA, also a very sizeable invest-
ment manager, have all publicly criticized hedge fund activists 
and the recent settlement process, suggesting that they per-
ceive themselves as having been excluded by these private 
agreements from the role they deserve as “permanent share-
holders,” often holding more stock than the activists.44  Profes-
sor Bebchuk and his colleagues discounted these criticisms, 
because they found that the nominees selected by activist 
hedge funds do not receive a lesser vote in subsequent director 
elections.45  One problem with this interpretation, however, is 
that the Bebchuk study covers results only until 2011, and 
these large diversified investors began voicing their concerns 
and criticisms only more recently in 2015 and 2016.46  Thus, it 
remains a very open and debatable issue whether this process 
is benign. 
All that need be concluded at this stage is that activists will 
usually resolve their differences with the firms they engage 
through private negotiations that typically change the composi-
tion of the board.  In the aftermath, the CEO will frequently 
depart.47  Although this process probably focuses on un-
derperforming firms, it has still troubled much larger institu-
tional investors, who consider themselves the target 
corporation’s “permanent” shareholders, but find themselves 
ignored in these negotiations. 
44 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text.  For SSGA’s objections, see 
infra notes 105–107 and accompanying text. 
45 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 5. 
46 See infra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
47 The Bebchuk study finds that 18.6% of CEOs depart within a year after the 
settlement agreement (although only about 3% of such agreements provide for the 
CEO’s departure). See Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 16.  A more recent study 
by FTI Consulting places the departure rates for CEOs after activist nominees are 
added to the board at 34.1% and 55.1% over one and two years, respectively, 
following these appointments. See Sonali Basak & Beth Jinks, Activist Investors 
Double Chance of CEO Exits, Study Shows, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 21, 2016), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/activist-investors-double-
chance-of-ceo-exits-study-shows [https://perma.cc/7ZBU-CNDM]. 
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II 
AGENCY COSTS OF HEDGE FUND ACTIVISM: AN EMPIRICAL 
ANALYSIS 
It is possible to hypothesize a variety of ways in which the 
activist hedge fund can gain private benefits not available to 
other shareholders or can act contrary to the wishes of the 
majority of the shareholders because of the leverage it pos-
sesses.  In the Theoretical Appendix, we set out a formal model 
underlying many of the arguments we sketch out in this Part. 
Here, we provide a brief survey of these private benefits, which 
are enough to raise serious concerns.  We begin by describing 
the data used to establish our empirical claims. 
A. Activist Settlements and Director Appointments 
We began by constructing a hand-drawn dataset on ac-
tivist settlements. First, we pulled all activist events between 
January 1, 2000 through December 31, 2015 from Shar-
kRepellent.  Next, based on SharkRepellent’s data, we divided 
the engagements into those that resulted in the activist receiv-
ing board representation and those that did not.48  We then 
examined the securities filings of firms in the former group to 
identify the nature of the settlement agreement, if any, that led 
to the appointment of the activist’s representative to the 
board.49 
We then coded the set of activist settlements along several 
dimensions.50  First, we identified the date on which the ac-
tivist’s representative gains access to the boardroom.51  We 
48 We focus on activist directors appointed through the settlement process 
because the contracting and compensation dynamic we refer to in Part II above is 
more reflective of settlement agreements than the uncertain products of the proxy 
fight process—a process that introduces additional costs and benefits that com-
plicated our analysis.  We intend to study activist directors elected through the 
proxy machinery in future work. 
49 We note that our dataset includes cases both where a formal settlement 
agreement is disclosed and where the target company simply notes in a later 
securities filing that the board and the activist have reached an agreement to 
appoint the activist’s representative to the board.  Both situations reflect an 
agreement to give the activist representation on the board, and in both cases the 
activists’ representative can be expected to have access to material nonpublic 
information. 
50 We exclude from the dataset any events where the target company lacks 
data in the Center for Research on Securities Prices (CRSP) database, where an 
activist has previously gained representation on the target company’s board, or 
where an incumbent director participates in the activist campaign itself. 
51 Ordinarily this is simply the exact date on which the new director joins the 
board—either by way of board appointment or election from the management 
slate at the annual meeting.  We note, however, that in approximately 8% of the 
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then identified the name of each new director and whether the 
director is an employee of the activist or is an industry expert.52 
We also drew from SharkRepellent information on whether the 
activist is a hedge fund, individual, investment advisor, corpo-
ration, mutual fund, named stockholder group, pension fund, 
or other institution or stakeholder. 
Finally, we examined the settlement agreements them-
selves, coding for whether the agreements prohibit the ac-
tivist’s initiation of or participation in a formal proxy fight or 
provide for the reimbursement of the activist’s expenses—both 
the amount and kind of expenses permitted, e.g., filing fees, 
time, and cost.  In light of our focus on information leakage, we 
also coded whether the agreement contains an express rule 
restricting information sharing, refers to an information-shar-
ing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement, or refers to a 
generic policy on information sharing.  In addition, we record 
whether these information-sharing policies apply only to new 
directors appointed pursuant to the settlement or whether the 
hedge fund itself is explicitly referenced in the agreement. 
Table 1 below provides summary statistics on the charac-
teristics of the 475 settlement agreements in our dataset: 
settlements in our dataset the activist instead settles for board “observer” rights, 
in which the new director gains access to the boardroom before her formal ap-
pointment to the board.  In these cases, we record the date on which the observer 
rights become effective.  For an example, see Settlement Agreement By and 
Among Axcelis Technologies and Vertex Capital (Mar. 5, 2015), https:// 
www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/11132321113232/000110465915017346/a 
15-1574_3ex99d2.htm [https://perma.cc/4Z7E-UW3Q] (permitting “each of the 
[activist’s chosen directors to be] appointed as an observer to the Board until the 
2015 Annual Meeting . . .[and will] receive copies of all notices and written infor-
mation furnished to the full Board, reasonably in advance of each meeting to the 
extent practicable, and [will be] permitted to be present at all meetings of the full 
Board”). 
52 We rely on SEC filings, company websites, and Bloomberg profiles to iden-
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TABLE 1. SUMMARY STATISTICS: ACTIVIST SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS. 
This Table summarizes the characteristics of the 475 




% of Overall 
Sample 
Average Number of Board 
Seats Acquired by Activist 1.76 (—) 
Activist Directors Granted 
Observer Rights in 
Advance of Appointment 
37 7.8% 








Average Standstill Length 
(in Annual Meetings) 
1.47 (—) 
Agreement Calls for
Reimbursement of Activist 
Expenses
166 34.9% 
As Table 1 shows, on average each activist engagement 
results in the appointment of just fewer than two activist repre-
sentatives to the target company’s board, and in nearly 70% of 
the agreements at least one of these representatives is an em-
ployee of the activist itself. 
B. Confidentiality and Information Sharing Provisions 
Of the 475 agreements in our sample, ninety-two (or 
19.4%) contain an express restriction on information shar-
ing.53  In sixty-four of these ninety-two cases, the restriction is 
set forth in the agreement, and in the remainder it is contained 
53 These provisions range from strict to more permissive.  For an example of a 
strict provision, one such agreement (between A.M. Castle & Co., the target firm, 
and Raging Capital Group, LLC, an activist investment advisor, and certain indi-
viduals in 2015) provided: 
Each Member agrees that the Confidential Information shall be kept 
confidential and that the Members and their Representatives shall 
not disclose any of the Confidential Information in any manner 
whatsoever without the specific prior written consent of the Com-
pany unless disclosure is required by applicable laws or regulations 
or pursuant to legal, judicial or regulatory proceedings . . . . 
Certain very limited exceptions are then carved out.  Settlement Agreement By 
and Among A. M. Castle & Co. and Raging Capital Group (Mar. 17, 2015), availa-
ble at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/18172/0000018172150 
00009/exhibit101ragingcapitalset.htm [https://perma.cc/FYT2-G5V4]. 
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in a separate confidentiality agreement.54  In addition, some 
seventy-three agreements (or another 16%) refer to a “policy” 
on information sharing.55  Regardless of whether the informa-
tion-sharing provision takes the form of a contractual rule or a 
state policy, we find that some ninety agreements contain an 
express reference to the activist investor, but these references 
usually still permit this investor easily to share information 
with others.56 
54 Confidentiality agreements are frequently not filed by an issuer with its 
Form 8-K or press release announcing the settlement agreement, and thus we did 
not have full access to them. 
55 For example, one such “policy” (in a settlement agreement between the 
same parties as in supra note 53, but negotiated a year later in 2016) stated: 
The [RC] nominee will be governed by the same obligations regard-
ing conflicts of interest, duties, confidentiality, trading and disclo-
sure policies and other governance guidelines as are applicable to 
all other directors of the Company, all of which policies and guide-
lines as in effect on the date hereof have been provided by the 
Company to the [RC] Group. 
Settlement Agreement By and Among A. M. Castle & Co. and Raging Capital 
Group (May 27, 2016), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives /edgar/data/ 
18172/000162612916000625/ex10-1.htm. [https://perma.cc/4PPB-3DJB]. 
Essentially, this “policy” states that the fund-nominated directors are subject 
to the same rules as the other directors, but it is far from transparent on what 
those rules are. 
56 Here, it is useful to give three examples: 
1. In the case of a “Nomination and Standstill Agreement,” dated 
February 25, 2014, by and among CONMED Corporation (the 
target firm), the Coppersmith Group (the activist investor), and 
certain nominee directors, Exhibit A to this Agreement provided: 
“Nothing contained in this Agreement shall prevent the Director 
from disclosing Confidential Information” to certain persons, 
defined as “Representatives,” which term includes a “principal 
of Coppersmith.”  Then, it adds that in the case of disclosure to 
such a “Representative” of the director: “Any Director Represen-
tative shall only be provided Confidential Information by the 
Director to the extent that they are informed of the confidential 
nature of the Confidential Information and agree or are other-
wise obligated to keep such information confidential and to re-
strict the use of such Confidential Information in accordance 
with the terms of this Agreement.” 
Thus, the director can share with the company’s advisors and its activist sponsor, 
but the director is required to observe confidentiality (which may allow the direc-
tor to inform still others if these persons in turn promise to observe confidential-
ity). See Nomination and Standstill Agreement (Feb. 25, 2014), available at 
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/816956/000089183614000036/ex_ 
10-1.htm [https://perma.cc/CS9L-2MBZ]. 
2. In the case of a “Form of Confidentiality Agreement” attached to 
a “Director Appointment Agreement,” dated November 1, 2014, 
by and among Epiq Systems, Inc. (the target), and St. Denis J. 
Villere & Company, L.L.C., (the activist investor), and certain 
director nominees, the Confidentiality Agreement permitted the 
director to disclose Confidential Information to the director’s 
“attorneys, advisors, directors, members, officials, and employ-
ees” who were collectively defined as its “Representatives.”  Par-
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Even after recognizing that many of these provisions are 
equivocal to weak, the fact still stands out that, in the remain-
ing 64% of the 475 agreements in our sample, nothing is said 
in publicly available documents about confidentiality or infor-
mation sharing.  As noted earlier,57 the market’s response to an 
agreement without any provision on information sharing is 
modest and dwarfed by its more positive reaction to the pres-
ence of such a provision.  Although multiple explanations are 
possible for this disparity,58 it at least suggests that it is impor-
tant to many activists that they be able to share broadly the 
agraph 2 of this Confidentiality Agreement required the Director 
Representatives to “not disclose any of the Confidential Informa-
tion in any manner whatsoever without the prior written con-
sent of the Company.” 
See Director Appointment Agreement (Nov. 1, 2014), available at https://www. 
sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1027207/000119312514395568/d815407dex 
994.htm [https://perma.cc/3N37-EJME].  Once again, the employees, directors, 
members, and officials of the activist investor can receive full access to what the 
nominee learns at board meetings (but are subject to a confidentiality obligation). 
3. Another variant on this general format was used by the Bar-
ington Group (the activist investor) in an “Agreement” it entered 
into with Lancaster Colony Corporation (the target) on October 
9, 2007.  It provides that: “The members of the Barington Group 
(each, a “Recipient”) each acknowledge the confidential and pro-
prietary nature of the Confidential Information (as defined be-
low) and agree that the Confidential Information (a) will be kept 
confidential by Recipient and Recipient’s Representatives and 
(b) will not be disclosed by Recipient (except to other Recipients 
and their Affiliates and Associates and such person’s Represent-
atives to the extent contemplated by this Agreement) or by Re-
cipient’s Representatives (as defined below) to any person 
except with the specific prior written consent of the Company or 
except as expressly otherwise permitted by this Agreement.” 
See Agreement by and Among Lancaster Colony Corp. and the Barington Group 
(Oct. 9, 2007), available at https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/57515/ 
000095015207007990/l28268aexv99w2.htm  [https://perma.cc/JM2R-EABN]. 
In all these cases, the agreement specifically permits the activist investor 
(here, as a “Recipient”) to obtain Confidential Information and share it with its 
“Representatives” (which term includes its “advisors” and employees).  Thus, this 
scope can include a large number of persons, all learning potentially market-
moving information. 
57 See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that the five-day differ-
ence in CARs is 2.2% versus 0.42%—or more than five times). 
58 This disparity could plausibly relate to the identity of the hedge fund.  If 
some activist funds were disfavored by the market (for any of a number of possible 
reasons) and these funds would not tolerate a confidentiality provision, then the 
disparity might relate less to the issue of confidentiality than to the identity of the 
fund.  However, because 64% of the settlement agreements in our data sample do 
not contain any information-sharing provision, it seems unlikely that the dispar-
ity is attributable to the “bad” reputation of some funds.  It is possible, however, 
that some activist funds with a “good” reputation do characteristically agree to a 
confidentiality restriction, and that the market is responding more to their iden-
tity than to the provision. 
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information they obtain from their director nominees.  Later, 
we will suggest why activist funds may feel this need.59 
C. Private Payments 
It is not uncommon for a corporation “engaged” by an ac-
tivist hedge fund to agree to reimburse the fund for the ex-
penses that it allegedly incurred in connection with the 
engagement.  These expenses might include SEC filing fees, 
legal expenses, or the costs of an actual proxy campaign (if one 
was conducted or if a draft proxy statement was prepared). 
Here, the Sotheby’s campaign stands out with its $10 million 
payment to Third Point. 
How typical is such a large payment?  The Bebchuk study 
includes no findings on this issue.  In our dataset of 475 settle-
ment agreements, we find that 166 (35%) have an expenses 
reimbursement provision of some sort.  We are able to identify 
a definite amount of expense reimbursement in 148 agree-
ments.  The mean and median amounts of expense reimburse-
ment are $328,753 and $100,000, respectively. Out of these 
148 settlement agreements, forty-one (27.7%) provide for a re-
imbursement in the amount of $250,000 or more, nineteen 
(12.8%) provide for $500,000 or more, and seven (4.7%) have 
an amount of $1,000,000 or more. 
These data suggest that payments of the same order of 
magnitude as that paid by Sotheby’s to Third Point are few. 
Although reimbursement is not uncommon, the amounts so 
paid are usually modest.  Because significant and legitimate 
legal expenses could be incurred by the activist in conducting 
an engagement, the limited reimbursement that hedge funds 
report suggests that activists may be constrained by the fear of 
reputational damage if they disclosed a substantial payment. 
Alternatively, the activist may want to proclaim that it expects 
to make such a large profit on its engagement that it does not 
need to be concerned with penny-ante matters, such as ex-
pense reimbursement.  Conceivably, some activists do receive a 
sizable payment, but fail to report it on the ground that it is not 
financially material.  Still, this seems unlikely to us for a vari-
ety of reasons.60 
What does the corporation gain for its payment?  Some 
have suggested that the corporation typically gains a “non-
59 See infra notes 97–103 and accompanying text. 
60 One reason is that management of the target would also need to make a 
disclosure about the settlement agreement, and the possibility that both would 
agree not to disclose the payment seems small in our judgment. 
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disparagement” provision in the settlement agreement.  These 
provisions, which are very common in settlement agreements, 
bar the activist from publicly criticizing the corporation and its 
management for the duration of the agreement.  In effect, the 
activist, as the champion of the shareholders, is silenced. 
Other forms of payments are also possible.  In 2017, Man-
tle Ridge Partners, LP, a newcomer to hedge fund activism, 
conducted an extraordinarily successful engagement with CSX 
Corp.  Although holding less than 5% of CSX’s stock, Mantle 
Ridge was able to secure the appointment of four of its nomi-
nees to the CSX board, including a new CEO, E. Hunter Harri-
son, who brought with him a new strategic plan for CSX. 
Effectively, Mantle Ridge and its new CEO engineered a palace 
coup d’etat at CSX.  Then, Mantle Ridge asked the CSX share-
holders to approve the CEO’s pay package in an advisory vote 
at CSX’s annual shareholder meeting.  This package included 
an $84 million reimbursement to Mantle Ridge of the compen-
sation and benefits forfeited by Harrison when he resigned as 
the CEO of Canadian Pacific to take the position at CSX.61 
Although the transaction produced a major stock price jump in 
CSX’s stock, others have noted the shareholders had little 
choice, as Harrison had indicated that he would resign if the 
reimbursement was not ratified by CSX’s shareholders.62  Be-
cause Harrison’s resignation might have caused a decline in 
the stock price that erased the earlier gain, CSX’s shareholders 
were effectively faced with Hobson’s choice. 
Cases such as CSX show both that shareholders may be 
pressured to ratify steps taken by their activist champion and 
61 For a description of this contest, see Shawn Tully, CSX CEO Hunter Harri-
son’s Pay is No Great Train Robbery, FORTUNE (Mar. 24, 2017), http://fortune. 
com/2017/03/24/csx-hunter-harrison-pay/ [https://perma.cc/4D86-M98V]. 
The payment went to Mantle Ridge, as it had earlier reimbursed Harrison.  CSX’s 
shareholders did vote by a wide margin to approve this payment in an advisory 
vote; thereafter, the CSX board made the legally binding decision to approve the 
payment. See Michael Flaherty, CSX Shareholders Approve $84 million Reim-
bursement to Mantle Ridge, REUTERS (June 5, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/ 
article/us-csx-harrison/csx-shareholders-approve-84-million-reimbursement-
to-mantle-ridge-idUSKBN18W1Y6 [https://perma.cc/TR46-3L7J].  Harrison died 
in December 2017, presenting issues about this ratification that are beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
62 In a review of the transaction, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP ob-
served that “a reasonable argument could be made that the shareholder vote is . . . 
a veneer to shield the board from a tough call.”  See Ethan A. Klingsberg & Arthur 
H. Kohn, Balancing Concessions to Activists Against Responsiveness to the 
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that shareholders can earn extraordinary stock gains from ac-
tivism.  Obviously, the goal should be to reduce agency costs 
without eliminating the shareholder gains. 
D. Information Leakage: Empirical Study 
In this Part, we present an empirical study, which finds 
that the appointment of an activist nominee or nominees to a 
corporate board is followed by a short-term increase in infor-
mation leakage into the target’s stock price.  That is, prior to 
the targeted corporation’s public disclosure of material infor-
mation (positive or negative) in the period after an activist nom-
inee is appointed to the board (or granted “observer” status at 
board meetings), its stock price drifts in the direction that the 
later corporate disclosure produces.  The market reacts to new 
developments before they are publicly announced, probably be-
cause informed trading by those with access to material, non-
public information is decoded by other traders to imply a likely 
gain or loss. 
To motivate our empirical study of leakage, we first calcu-
late CARs to announcements of settlement agreements.  In our 
entire sample of settlement agreements, we find that the aver-
age five-day announcement CAR is 2.64%.  But this average 
conceals substantial heterogeneity.  When we examine settle-
ments without any hedge fund employee appointed to the 
board, we find that the five-day CAR is 4.21%, compared to 
1.95% for settlements with an employee-nominee appointed to 
the board.  This suggests that the market is skeptical of hedge 
fund employees as directors.  Similarly, when we examine set-
tlements with an express rule on information sharing or a rule 
in a separate confidentiality agreement, we find that the five-
day CAR is 2.25%, compared to 0.42% for those settlements 
that contain neither of those restrictions on information 
sharing.63 
This presents a puzzle.  Why do activist funds continue to 
appoint their employees to the board and avoid express confi-
dentiality provisions in settlement agreements, despite the 
market’s clear contrary preferences?  Activists may believe that 
the advantages of having an activist on the board and skipping 
any confidentiality provision in the settlement agreement out-
weigh the costs of bucking the market’s preferences.  Those 
63 As noted at supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text, 19.4% of our data 
sample has a contractual provision that restricted information sharing and an-
other 16% refers to a “policy” on information sharing.  Thus, slightly over 64% are 
silent on this issue and seem to experience a much smaller CAR. 
ri 
leaki,t = t-s,t-1 
i 
rt-st , 0 
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more skeptical of activism suspect that information sharing by 
the lead activist with its allies may be an important means by 
which the lead activist can hold together its loose coalition of 
allies (or wolf pack) and thus maintain its leverage over the 
target company.64  Another possibility is that activist funds 
appoint employees and disdain confidentiality provisions 
chiefly when the activists already possess sufficient leverage 
that target managements dare not resist them for fear that they 
will incur a proxy contest that they are unlikely to win.65  No 
conclusion or preferred theory is here expressed. 
In any event, we next examine how information leakage 
correlates with these two variables (i.e., an employee nominee 
and the absence of a confidentiality provision).  We construct a 
dataset that enables us to evaluate the incorporation of infor-
mation into public-company stock prices.  In general, federal 
law requires many material events to be disclosed on Form 8-K, 
which generally must be filed within four business days after 
the occurrence of the event.  Thus, Form 8-K filings are typi-
cally not scheduled well in advance of their filing and often 
respond to unexpected developments.  We begin with 635,490 
Form 8-Ks filed by 7,799 publicly traded companies over the 
period of January 1, 2000 to September 30, 2016. 
For each Form 8-K filing, we seek to examine the pace at 
which the information in the filing makes its way into the com-
pany’s stock price.  To do so, we derive a “leakage” measure for 
a given firm (which we denote as firm “i”) filing a form 8-K on a 
given date (which we denote as date “t”), which we denote leaki,t, 
and is equivalent to a standard measure used in the finance 
literature known as the “Weighted Price Contribution.”66  We 
calculate this measure as follows: 
Put simply, the leakage measure is a fraction: the numerator is 
the percentage change67 in the closing stock price of the firm 
filing the Form 8-K from (a) five days before the event to (b) the 
day before the event, and the denominator is the percentage 
64 We discuss this possibility later in infra notes 86–90 and accompanying 
text. 
65 In these cases, the market may already expect an activist victory, so the 
stock market response to the use of a hedge fund employee may be more muted. 
66 Michael J. Barclay & Terrence Hendershott, Price Discovery and Trading 
After Hours, 16 REV. FIN. STUD., 1041, 1055, 1058 (2003). 
67 These are actually the natural log of 1 + the percentage change, i.e., the 
continuously compounded return over that time. 
Et-5,t-1 
Et-5,to 
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change in the closing stock price of the firm filing the Form 8-K 
from (a) five days before the event to (b) the day of the event. 
To take a simple example, suppose that the firm’s stock 
price was $10 at the close of business five days before the 
event, $11 the day before the event, and $12 on the day of the 
event.  The numerator of the ratio is approximately 10%:68  $10 
(the price five days before) to $11 (the price one day before) is 
an increase of 10%.  The denominator of the ratio is approxi-
mately 20%: $10 (the price five days before) to $12 (the price on 
the day of the event) is an increase of 20%.  The leakage is 50%, 
which is obtained by calculating 10% / 20%.  On average, then, 
higher levels of leakage indicate that information reflected in 
the Form 8-K made its way into stock prices in the day before 
the actual disclosure of that information on Form 8-K.69 
The key idea is that this ratio increases as more informa-
tion makes its way into the stock price prior to the announce-
ment date.  However, working with this ratio poses certain 
challenges as an empirical matter.  Theoretically, this ratio 
should remain bounded between zero and one—e.g., if the 
stock price goes up by $2 from five days before to the day of the 
disclosure (inclusive), it should not go up by $3 from five days 
before disclosure to the day before the disclosure and fall by $1 
on the day of disclosure.  But in practice, this often happens— 
simply because markets are not perfectly efficient and trading 
is noisy.  Once we recognize that prices can move for random 
reasons, it is possible that the denominator may be very close 
to zero while the numerator is not, causing the ratio to “blow 
up” dramatically.  This poses nontrivial challenges for statisti-
cal inference.70 
68 We use the term “approximately” because of the continuously com-
pounding return. 
69 We note that information disclosed on Form 8-K is occasionally previously 
disclosed to the public in the form of press releases or other public announce-
ments.  To address that possibility we search the text of each Form 8-K for 
phrases related to the issuance of a press release and control for the presence of 
that phrase in our leakage analysis. 
70 Technically, suppose that both and 
where and  are zero-mean i.i.d. nor-
mally distributed random variables.  Even if it is the case that , it 
does not follow that .  The ratio of the noise terms
 is the ratio of two zero-mean normally random variables.  This term is 
Cauchy distributed for which both the first and second moment are not defined. 
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There are two ways to address this problem.  The standard 
approach in the finance literature is to multiply this ratio by a 
weight that is proportional to the absolute value of the denomi-
nator.  This is the approach taken by Michael Barclay and Ter-
rence Hendershott when deriving the “Weighted Price 
Contribution,” which they use to measure how much stock 
prices move during different times of the day.71  This ensures 
that observations which have a denominator very close to zero 
receive a weight very close to zero.  We adopt this approach for 
our primary results, weighting OLS regressions by the absolute 
value of the denominator. 
An alternative approach is to remove filings with “negative” 
leakage (i.e., where the numerator and denominator of the ratio 
had different signs), as the ratio is not meaningful in that case, 
and to remove filings with leakage greater than 1, which im-
plies a market “overreaction” to the news, while adjusting the 
coefficient estimates and standard errors for the truncation.72 
As we show below, our results are generally consistent, both in 
sign and statistical significance, across these two 
specifications. 
We code as “treatment” filings Form 8-Ks filed by firms that 
entered into activist settlement agreements and code as “post” 
filings Form 8-Ks filed after the date that the new director 
gained access to material nonpublic information, either by join-
ing the board or obtaining observer rights to its deliberations.73 
This results in essentially 475 different treatments occurring 
between 2000 and 2016.  This gives us comfort that, from the 
perspective of causal identification, the effect we measure is 
unlikely to be driven by an unobservable time trend over a 
single period of time. 
Another challenge with making causal inferences as to the 
effect of appointing activist directors on information leakage is 
constructing an appropriate “control group.”  We consider mul-
tiple approaches to show that our results are not driven by the 
choice of a single kind of control group.  Our primary estima-
71 The formula for the weight is simple: which is exactly 
what Barclay & Hendershott utilize in the Weighted Price Contribution. See Bar-
clay & Hendershott, supra note 66, at 1055. 
72 We estimate the truncated re gression model via maximum likelihood as 
described in J. SCOTT LONG, REGRESSION MODELS FOR CATEGORICAL AND LIMITED DE-
PENDENT VARIABLES 192 (1997). 
73 To reduce the likelihood that the results are driven by differences in leak-
age far away in time from the date on which the director first gains access to the 
boardroom, we limit the sample window to an even shorter period before and after 
the new director gains access to material nonpublic information. 
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tions use a “same-industry” control group: we collect, for each 
settlement agreement, all the Form 8-K filings by other public 
companies with the same 4-digit SIC industry code as the tar-
get firm.  For each settlement, there is a treatment firm and a 
group of control firms which are assigned the same “access to 
material nonpublic information” date.  As we explain below, we 
further apply propensity-score matching to ensure that we are 
comparing pre to post differences in leakage between the treat-
ment firms and groups of control firms that are as similar as 
possible. 
For several reasons, we considered it important to verify 
that the disclosure behavior was similar between our treatment 
and control groups.  In other words, did companies that were 
the target of a hedge fund engagement file more (or less) Form 
8-Ks than those in the treatment group.  We find disclosure 
behavior to be remarkably similar between the two groups. 
Figure 2 shows a “kernel density plot” for the years between 
2000 and 2015.74  The close congruence it reveals between the 
control and treatment groups suggests that the disclosure be-
havior of public firms does not change because of the appoint-
ment of an activist director; both seem to file Form 8-Ks with 
the same frequency. 
74 A “kernel density plot” shows the frequency of Form 8-K filings at very 
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SUMMARY STATISTICS: KERNEL DENSITY PLOT OF FORM 8-K FILINGS 
OVER TIME.  The plot below illustrates the volume of Form 8-K 
filings over time in both our treatment and control groups; as 
shown below, the incidence of Form 8-Ks in each group over 
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We derive several additional variables for each firm which 
could plausibly affect information leakage: its market capitali-
zation (number of shares times price), the Amihud illiquidity 
measure,75 and the idiosyncratic volatility of the firm’s stock.76 
Each of these are calculated over the month preceding each 
Form 8-K filing. 
We also calculate the log of the firm’s book-to-market ratio, 
using its most recent Compustat annual report.  We compute 
the length of the Form 8-K filing as well as whether it refers to a 
“press release,” which might indicate that the filing does not 
necessarily contain new, public information.  Finally, we ex-
tract the item numbers—that is, legally specified categories of 
75 The Amihud illiquidity measure is the average of the daily ratio of the 
absolute stock return for that day to the trading volume of that day, as described 
in Yakov Amihud, Illiquidity and Stock Returns: Cross-Section and Time-Series 
Effects, 5 J. FIN. MKTS. 31 (2000). For computational simplicity, we depart slightly 
from the original Amihud paper by using number of shares in the denominator, 
rather than dollar volume; the two are virtually indistinguishable in daily trading 
data. 
76 Idiosyncratic volatility is the standard deviation of what remains after sub-
tracting the predictions of asset pricing model from stock returns. 
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information—from each Form 8-K filing.77  We merge the leak-
age data with these additional variables, along with the 
“treatment characteristics” coding from the activist settlement 
agreements, to arrive at the final dataset used in the analysis 
described below. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics from this dataset, in-
cluding the number of Form 8-K filings, as well as statistics 
such as the mean, standard deviation, median, and various 
percentiles for each Form 8-K in the dataset.  Variables that 
correspond to a firm—like the Amihud illiquidity measure or 
idiosyncratic volatility—reflect the firm filing the Form 8-K and 
are “linked” to the Form 8-K filed by that firm because these 
could potentially explain variation in leakage. 
77 Public companies today are required to file a Form 8-K for a wide range of 
corporate events.  In securities law parlance, the various events that are subject to 
disclosure on Form 8-K are referred to as “items.”  For example, Item 1.03 on 
Form 8-K requires disclosure of whether the company has entered bankruptcy or 
receivership, Item 2.01 requires disclosure of the completion of the acquisition or 
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TABLE 2. SUMMARY STATISTICS: ESTIMATION DATASET. 
Number




(% change 5 575,196 -0.003 0.129 -2.695 -0.054 0.004 0.049 3.545
days before 
to event day) 
Leakage 
Numerator
(% change 5 575,196 -0.002 0.087 -2.678 -0.029 0.001 0.027 3.449
days before 
to 1 day 
before) 
Leakage 575,196 0.584 0.265  0.0001 0.380 0.621 0.807 1.000
Measure 
Treatment 









Hedge Fund 12,681 0.811 0.391 0 1 1 1 1
Dummy 
Hedge Fund 
Employee 12,681 0.700 0.458 0 0 1 1 1 
Dummy 
Amihud 
(2002)  500,756 4.933 8.419 0.000 1.269 2.379 5.006 782.695
Illiquidity 
Idiosyncratic 500,659 0.030 0.026 0.000 0.015  0.023 0.036 1.393
Volatility 
Market 500,757 5,770,181 23,888,702 633.566 157,635 591,091 2,159,389 735,734,809
Capitalization 





575,196 -53.424 588.806 -1,064 -552 -70 425 1,064Intervention 
and 8-K 
Filing Date 
Length of 8-K 
Filing 575,190 548,488 2,123,165 1,315 27,811 74,620 307,421 152,816,998 
(Characters) 
Our analysis mainly considers whether the change in leak-
age before and after the activist intervention differs between 
our treatment and control groups.  This is known as a “differ-
ence in differences” design because we compare the change 
over time (difference #1) between treatment and control (differ-
ence #2).  We restrict our sample to “time windows” of 120 days 
on either side of the activist board appointment date.  But we 
exclude the three weeks on either side of this date to ensure 
that our results are not driven by leakage of information re-
garding the settlement agreement itself. 
The difference-in-differences design relies on the assump-
tion that the treatment and control groups follow parallel 
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trends over time—that is, in the absence of the activist settle-
ment, changes in leakage over time would remain similar be-
tween the two groups.  Qualitatively, there is no reason to 
suspect that activist funds choose targets that are more likely 
to experience greater information leakage in the months follow-
ing the intervention.  While we acknowledge, of course, that 
activist investors select targets based on characteristics such 
as relative historical performance,78 we see little basis to worry 
that those characteristics are correlated with time trends in 
information leakage.79  We also verify this assumption below. 
In addition to a difference-in-differences design, we employ 
propensity-score matching to make it more likely that the treat-
ment and control firms are as comparable as possible.  Match-
ing methods have become increasingly popular in empirical 
corporate governance research.80  These methods allow for 
forming pairs or small groups of firms who are similar on ob-
servable dimensions and compare only those firms to each 
other, effectively weighting by similarity.  We match treatment 
and control firms based on observable covariates including the 
log of market capitalization, Amihud illiquidity, idiosyncratic 
volatility, the book-to-market ratio, whether the filing refers to 
a press release, 1-digit SIC code, as well as the following Form 
8-K item disclosures:81 
 Item 1.01: Entry into a Material Definitive Agreement 
78 See Cremers et al., supra note 1, at 6. 
79 To give an illustration of why a selection critique of this kind is unlikely to 
be a problem in this design, suppose that hedge funds select targets on the basis 
of poor governance, and suppose, in turn, that poor governance is correlated with 
insider trading activity.  But in a difference-in-differences design, the results can 
only be biased by time-varying omitted variables.  Thus, for this objection to be 
problematic it must be the case that hedge funds select targets for activist inter-
vention on the basis of unobserved trends in increasing leakage.  It is hard to 
imagine what such a trend might be, especially because, with 475 different ac-
tivist directors gaining boardroom access at different points in time, this kind of 
time trend cannot merely be a spurious coincidence at a particular moment in 
calendar time—it must be a consistent trend throughout time. 
80 See, e.g., K.J. Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov & Simone M. Sepe, Stag-
gered Boards and Long-Term Firm Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 422, 434 
(2017) (using a matching method to analyze long-term firm value and board 
structure). 
81 Because we only have so much data, we are limited in our ability to match 
on high-dimensional covariates like Form 8-K item numbers in addition to a 4-
digit SIC code.  The standard approach in this kind of situation is to “coarsen” the 
matching groups, i.e., to choose covariates at a sufficiently broad level of general-
ity that the matching is feasible. See, e.g., Stefano M. Iacus, Gary King & Giu-
seppe Porro, CEM: Software for Coarsened Exact Matching, 30 J. STAT. SOFTWARE 
1, 1–27 (2009) (discussing a program that implements the coarsened exact 
matching algorithm).  We apply this sort of coarsened matching by using 1-digit 
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 Item 2.02: Results of Operations and Financial Condition 
 Item 5.02(a)-(b): Departure of Directors or Certain Officers 
 Item 5.02(d): Election of Directors 
 Item 7.01: Regulation FD Disclosure 
 Item 8.01: Other Events 
We allow up to five nearest neighbors so that results are not 
driven by arbitrarily close matches. 
We empirically verify the validity of these matching meth-
ods in two ways.  First, we perform a “balance test” examining 
whether the propensity-score matching succeeded in yielding a 
balanced treatment and control group.  The results are shown 
in Table 3. 
TABLE 3. BALANCE TEST ON FIRM AND FILING CHARACTERISTICS.  In 
this Table, we compare the means of each of the key covariates 
used in the matching design between treatment and control. 
The table shows the mean for each of the groups, the difference 
as a percentage of the treated group, the t-statistic of this 
difference, and the associated p-value.  A p-value above .05 
indicates that there is no statistically significant difference in 
the means of the two groups, indicating that the null 
hypothesis of balance on these observable characteristics 
cannot be rejected. 
Mean 
% t- p-
Treated Control bias statistic value 
Amihud (2002) 0.4259 0.43667 -1.5 -0.54 0.592 
Log Market Value 13.212 13.209 0.1 0.04 0.97 
Contains “Press Release” 0.60677 0.60437 0.5  0.15  0.882 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.02851 0.02808 1.7 0.61 0.54 
Book-to-Market Ratio -4.5058 -4.5587 2.7 0.83 0.405
Item 1.01: Entry into a
Material Definitive 
Agreement 0.16439 0.17236 -2.2 -0.64 0.519 
Item 2.02: Results of 
Operations and Financial 
Condition 0.28345 0.27974 0.8 0.25  0.803 
Item 5.02(a)-(b): Departure of 
Directors or Certain Officers  0.17641 0.17553 0.2 0.07 0.945
Item 5.02(d): Election of 
Directors  0.24468 0.24697 -0.6 -0.16 0.872 
Item 7.01: Regulation FD 
Disclosure 0.17094 0.16395 1.8 0.57 0.571 
Item 8.01: Other Events  0.23867 0.23539 0.8 0.23 0.816 
In addition, we plot the density of the propensity score for the 
treatment and control groups.  If the two groups are balanced 
~ 
I 
~ - - -
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on observable characteristics, the propensity score should ap-
pear similar between the two groups.  Figure 4 shows this is 
indeed the case. 
FIGURE 4.  DENSITY OF PROPENSITY SCORE.  This Figure plots the 
empirical density of the propensity score for the treatment and 
control groups.  As the Figure shows, the two groups are 
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Finally, in the Online Appendix, we show that pre-trends on the 
leakage outcome for the treatment and control groups are par-
allel, which is an important condition for the kind of difference-
in-differences design that we employ here to be valid.  Taken 
together, these results suggest that the leakage findings in this 
Article are not driven by differences in the kind of information 
firms are disclosing to the market.  Satisfied that our identifica-
tion assumption is consistent with the evidence, we now turn 
to measuring the effects of activist settlements, and the direc-
tors appointed pursuant to those settlements, on leakage at the 
firms that enter into those agreements. 
E. Information Leakage after Activist Directors Gained 
Boardroom Access 
We first consider whether the change in leakage before and 
after the date on which the activist settlement gives a new 
director access to the boardroom differs between our treatment 
and control firms.  To evaluate this question, we perform a 
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regression analysis which estimates the change in leakage from 
before to after the director is appointed to the board and com-
pares that change between the treatment and control groups. 
Next, we seek to find if there are significant differences in leak-
age depending on who is appointed to the board (in particular, 
an independent person versus a hedge fund employee).  As 
noted above, we code each director’s identity on the basis of 
public searches and classify directors according to whether or 
not they are employees of the activist investor.82  Finally, we 
consider whether the post-settlement increases in leakage we 
identify vary depending on the presence or absence of confiden-
tiality provisions in the settlement agreement.  The difference-
in-differences coefficients from each of these estimations are 
shown in Table 5 using our primary specification and in Table 
6 using our alternative truncation model. 
TABLE 5. INFORMATION LEAKAGE. In this Table, we estimate the 
difference in the over-time change in leakage between the 
treatment and control groups. We show the results of OLS 
regression models in which the dependent variable is leaki,t, the 
leakage for a particular Form 8-K filing, weighted by and 
the propensity-score weight. The sample is limited to Form 8-K 
filings within a window of [-120,-21] and [+21,+120]. The model 
is given by the following linear specification: 
where di is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 8-K filing is in 
the treatment group; postt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if 
the 8-K filing occurred after the director appointment date; and 
ei,t is a random error term.  The coefficient of interest is b3, 
which captures the over-time difference in leakage between the 
two groups.  We cluster standard errors by firm-event to adjust 
for serial correlation in leakage.  T-statistics are provided below 
correlation coefficients in parentheses.  We use the following 
indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, ** 
indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10. 
82 The majority of securities filings related to settlement agreements specify 
the nature of the activist director’s relationship, if any, with the activist.  In addi-
tion, we found that the activist employee–appointees are typically senior execu-
tives of the activist, making identification of their relationship with the investor 
straightforward.  Directors who are not employees of the activist, by contrast, are 
typically current or former senior executives in the target company’s industry, 
making identification of their employment and expertise similarly straightforward. 
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Leakage  Leakage Leakage  Leakage 
Treatment x Post 0.0752**
 (t-statistic) (2.17) 
Hedge Fund x Post 0.0994***
 (t-statistic) (2.92) 
Not Hedge Fund x Post -0.0225




 (t-statistic) (2.01) 
Non-Employee-Director
x Post 0.0731 
(t-statistic) (1.28) 
No Information-Sharing 
Rule x Post 
0.1107**
 (t-statistic) (2.34) 
Information-Sharing
Rule x Post 0.0631 
(t-statistic) (1.17) 
Observations 9,414 9,414 9,414 9,414 
TABLE 6. INFORMATION  LEAKAGE (ALTERNATIVE  TRUNCATION 
SPECIFICATION). In this Table, we estimate the difference in the 
over-time change in leakage between the treatment and control 
groups. We show the results of truncated regression models 
(Long, 1997) in which the dependent variable is leaki,t, the 
leakage for a particular Form 8-K filing, for those filings where 
0 < leaki,t < 1. The sample is limited to Form 8-K filings within a 
window of [-120,-21] and [+21,+120]. The model is given by the 
following linear specification: 
where di is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 8-K filing is in 
a treatment group; postt is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 
8-K filing occurred after the director appointment date; xi,t is a 
vector of time-varying covariates: the decile of the firm’s market 
value, idiosyncratic volatility, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure, and the log of the firm’s book-to-market ratio; each 
as of the month preceding the Form 8-K filing, or current year 
in the case of the book-to-market ratio, as well as filing-level 
covariates: the filing length and fixed effects for item numbers; 
and ei,t is a random error term.  The coefficient of interest is b3, 
which captures the over-time difference in leakage between the 
two groups.  We cluster standard errors by firm-event to adjust 
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for serial correlation in leakage.  T-statistics are provided below 
correlation coefficients in parentheses. We use the following 
indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, ** 
indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10. 
Leakage Leakage Leakage  Leakage 
Treatment x Post 0.2535***
 (t-statistic) (2.73) 
Hedge Fund x Post 0.2701***
 (t-statistic) (2.68) 





 (t-statistic) (2.17) 
Non-Employee-
Director x Post 
0.2907*
 (t-statistic) (1.74) 
No Information-
Sharing Rule x Post 
0.4985***
 (t-statistic) (3.28) 
Information-Sharing
Rule x Post 
0.0453 
(t-statistic) (0.29) 
Observations 23,002 23,002 23,002 23,002 
In Tables 5 and 6, the bold faced entries across from 
“Treatment x Post” show that settlement firms experience an 
average increase of 7.5 (in Table 5) or 25 (in Table 6) percentage 
points in leakage above that of the control firms over a four-
month window following the appointment of the activist direc-
tor(s) to the board.83  The variation in the two estimates is 
driven by the different weighting and truncation procedure. 
83 Does this effect persist over the long-term?  We can think of at least two 
reasons why leakage is unlikely to persist many months into the future.  One is 
that the activist hedge fund, having achieved its goal of appointing directors to the 
target’s board, may swiftly bring about the desired financial or operating changes 
and then shift its attention elsewhere.  Activists typically sell their positions after 
a holding period of around one year.  A second possibility is, as suggested in the 
Theoretical Appendix, that if the leakage effect is driven by illegal conduct, the 
probability of detection may increase over time, thus deterring leakage increas-
ingly as time progresses.  We considered whether the effect we measure persists 
over a longer one-year window (-365, +365) following the appointment of the 
directors to the board.  We estimated the same specification described above over 
that longer period.  Unlike the results from our short-term sample, we found that 
the difference-in-difference coefficient is not significantly different when estimat-
ing leakage over a longer window following the activist intervention. 
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The former estimate is smaller because it includes many obser-
vations of “negative” leakage (i.e., wrong-way trading), while the 
latter excludes those cases via truncation.  These two models 
simply take different approaches to accounting for cases that 
do not easily fit the “percentage of price change” interpretation 
of the leakage ratios.  In both specifications, this difference is 
statistically significant at the 1% level, meaning the probability 
that this result was obtained by random chance is less than 
1%. 
Similarly, firms that are targets of activist investors experi-
ence an increase in leakage of 9.94 percentage points (in Table 
5) or 27.9 percentage points (in Table 6), on average, above that 
of the control firms, over the four-month window following the 
appointment of the activist director(s) to the board.  As before, 
the variation is driven by the difference in truncation.  In both 
specifications, this difference is statistically significant at the 
1% level.  On the other hand, the row labeled “Not Hedge Fund 
x Post” shows that the estimated over-time increase in leakage 
for firms that are the targets of non-hedge fund investors is 
inconsistently estimated, ranging from -0.0225 to 22.4 per-
centage points.  However, none of these estimates are statisti-
cally significant at the 1%, 5% or even 10% level.  Thus, there is 
a high probability the non-hedge fund estimates were obtained 
by random chance alone.84  Our findings are consistent with 
the conjecture that information leakage increases with the in-
tervention of hedge fund activists in a way that differs mean-
ingfully from interventions by other investors, but we reiterate 
that this statistical finding does not establish illegal conduct or 
a violation of Rule 10b-5. 
Next, we compare the over-time difference in leakage be-
tween the control group and two treatment groups: those 
where employees of the activist are appointed to the target’s 
board pursuant to the settlement agreement and those where 
the appointed directors are not employees of the activist.  The 
bold-faced row labeled “Employee Director Dummy x Post” 
shows that settlements which provide for the appointment of at 
least one director who is an employee of the acquiror experi-
ence an increase of 7.6 or 24 percentage points in leakage, on 
average, above that of the control firms, over the four-month 
window following the appointment of the activist director(s) to 
the board.  This difference is statistically significant at the 5% 
84 However, an F-test does not indicate that the difference in these coeffi-
cients is statistically significant.  An “F-test” is a statistical test of the hypothesis 
that the difference in regression coefficients was caused by random chance alone. 
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level.  On the other hand, the row labeled “Not Employee Direc-
tor Dummy x Post” shows that the estimated increase in leak-
age for settlements which provide solely for the appointment of 
non-employee directors is statistically insignificant in the pri-
mary specification, and only marginally significant at the 10% 
level in the truncated specification.85  Taken together, these 
results suggest that the non-employee director estimates were 
obtained by random chance alone. The only leakage result that 
is consistently statistically meaningful is that of employee 
directors. 
Although the reason for this heterogeneity deserves closer 
consideration, we offer several possibilities for further study. 
First, to the extent that the mechanism producing the leakage 
we observe is trading facilitated by directors, activist investor 
employees—usually finance professionals—are more likely 
than non-employees to have access either to (i) trading capital 
of the magnitude necessary to produce the stock price move-
ments that we observe, or (ii) professional traders willing to act 
as their agents (presumably for a share of the profits).  Second, 
to the extent that the mechanism for disseminating confiden-
tial information is loose gossip, hedge fund employees (either 
directors or fellow employees in contact with them) live in an 
environment of traders where the value of such information is 
well understood (and where reciprocal benefits and tips may be 
expected in the future by those who tip today).  We will call this 
the “favor bank” explanation, as it suggests that there may be 
norms of reciprocity observed by many in the financial world 
who engage in such information sharing.  Third, it is possible 
that either the reputational loss associated with improper facil-
itation of informed trading or the acceptance of moral norms 
that preclude participation in such trading is higher for non-
employees—typically industry experts and often current or for-
mer officers of large public companies—than for less visible 
activist employees.  Arguably, such experts and executives are 
either more easily deterred or more morally inhibited.  We do 
not assert, however, that we have proven any of these 
conjectures. 
We now consider whether these post-settlement increases 
in leakage differ with information-sharing provisions in the set-
tlement agreement.  As noted above, we classified each settle-
ment agreement with respect to several information-sharing 
provisions, including whether the agreement contains an ex-
85 As with the prior result, an F-test does not indicate that the difference in 
these coefficients is statistically significant. 
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press rule on information sharing, refers to an information-
sharing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement, or refers 
to a generic policy on information sharing.  As before, we con-
sider two treatment groups: those with either an express rule 
on information sharing or a reference to an information-shar-
ing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement and those with-
out either of these provisions.  In our primary specification, the 
coefficient on the latter is twice as large as the former.86  In our 
alternative specification, the agreements lacking a rule restric-
tion on information sharing have nearly twelve times as much 
leakage as those with a rule on information sharing, while the 
statistical significance of the former is extremely high whereas 
the latter is not even close to significant.  In the alternative 
specification, the standard statistical test (known as an “F-
test”) indicates that the difference in these coefficients is statis-
tically significant. 
In other words, the leakage difference correlates closely 
with whether activist settlements contain either an express 
rule on information sharing or a reference to an information-
sharing rule in a separate confidentiality agreement.  We do not 
suggest that this correlation is causal—we are not claiming 
that the presence of such a rule deters leakage.  Rather, one 
possible explanation for this difference may be that activists 
differ in their willingness to share material, nonpublic informa-
tion and the market can distinguish those more likely to main-
tain confidentiality (who also happen to be the ones most likely 
to insert such a confidentiality provision in their settlement 
agreements). 
One general objection to our analysis thus far is that the 
control group may not be sufficiently comparable to the treat-
ment group(s), even with the propensity-score matching, be-
cause these control firms are not undergoing the kind of far-
reaching corporate change that takes place following a settle-
ment agreement.87  This concern essentially states the relevant 
counterfactual for our causal analysis: would information leak-
age have increased but for the appointment of directors pursu-
ant to the settlement agreement or but for the enactment of 
operational changes pursuant to the hedge fund’s demands? 
The latter implies that the leakage effect we identify is caused 
by hedge fund activism but not necessarily the settlement or 
86 However, an F-test does not indicate that the difference in these coeffi-
cients is statistically significant. 
87 We thank Lucian Bebchuk and Alon Brav for independently raising this 
important concern. 
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appointment of directors to the boardroom.  This still raises 
important policy concerns, but the mechanism is different. 
We have taken this objection seriously and found two tests 
by which to measure if it does indeed impact our results.  First, 
we utilize an alternative control group consisting of those firms 
which experienced a Schedule 13-D filing but did not engage in 
a settlement agreement.  On average, these firms are undergo-
ing operational change in response to hedge fund activism and 
thus supply a counterfactual that more precisely isolates the 
settlement itself (though at the cost of some statistical power, 
as this sample is much smaller).  The challenge is choosing the 
relevant “settlement” date in these cases, as both the treatment 
and control groups had a 13-D filing prior to the settlement. 
Our primary approach is to add the median distance between a 
13-D and settlement filing (148 calendar days) to this alterna-
tive control group’s 13-D filing date, though we also randomly 
sampled a 13-D settlement date distance and obtained very 
similar results.  We apply the same propensity-score matching 
as previously (again, obtaining balance across the covariates), 
and present the results of our analysis with this alternative 
control group in Table 7. 
TABLE 7. INFORMATION  LEAKAGE (13-D CONTROL  GROUP).  In this 
Table, we estimate the difference in the over-time change in 
leakage between the treatment and an alternative control 
group consisting of firms subject to activist engagements that 
did not result in a settlement, where the “activist director 
appointment date” for the control firms is equal to the 13-D 
date plus the median difference between the settlement and 
13-D date in the treatment group.  We show the results of OLS 
regression models in which the dependent variable is leaki,t, the 
leakage for a particular Form 8-K filing, weighted by and 
the propensity-score weight.  The sample is limited to Form 8-K 
filings within a window of [-120,-21] and [+21,+120]. The 
model is given by the following linear specification: 
where di is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the 8-K filing is in 
a treatment group (see below); postt is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if the 8-K filing occurred after the director appoint-
ment date; and ei,t is a random error term.  The coefficient of 
interest is b3, which captures the over-time difference in leak-
age between the two groups.  We cluster standard errors by 
firm-event to adjust for serial correlation in leakage.  T-statis-
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We use the following indicators of statistical significance: *** 
indicates p < 0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p  < 
0.10. 
Leakage Leakage Leakage  Leakage 
Treatment x Post 0.1099***
 (t-statistic) (2.59) 
Hedge Fund x Post 0.1362***
 (t-statistic) (3.25) 









 (t-statistic) (1.76) 
No Information-
Sharing Rule x Post 
0.1012*
 (t-statistic) (1.68) 
Information-Sharing
Rule x Post 
0.1434***
 (t-statistic) (2.71) 
Observations 5,364 5,364 5,364 5,364 
Table 7 shows that the results with this alternative control 
group are generally consistent with our prior findings.  The 
difference-in-differences coefficient for the treatment group is 
positive, statistically significant, and of a similar magnitude as 
the prior control group.  There is a large numerical difference 
between the hedge fund and non-hedge fund groups, just as 
before.  The employee-director group is statistically significant, 
whereas the non-employee-director group is not.  The only dif-
ference is that the prior no information-sharing rule finding 
reverses direction in this alternative control group 
specification. 
To further shed light on the possibility that information 
leakage is driven by the activist engagement rather than the 
appointment of directors pursuant to the settlement, we look 
within the treatment group and compare information leakage 
after the Schedule 13-D filing (but before the appointment of 
nominee directors) and leakage after the appointment of these 
directors pursuant to the settlement.  The latter period allows 
us to isolate the additional impact of the director appointment 
as a possible conduit for information leakage.  Specifically, we 
lrLs,t0 I 
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compare leakage for Form 8-Ks filed between two periods: (1) a 
“pre” period that begins seven days after the Schedule 13-D 
filing and ends seven days before the director appointment to 
the board pursuant to the settlement and (2) a “post” period 
that begins seven days after the director appointment and ends 
120 days after.  In this specification, we simply compare leak-
age between these two periods.  The results are given in Table 
8, which contains a column for each of the treatment groups 
considered thus far: all settlements, hedge-fund only, em-
ployee-director only, and no information-sharing only. 
TABLE 8. INFORMATION  LEAKAGE: AFTER 13-D (BUT  BEFORE 
APPOINTMENT) VS. AFTER APPOINTMENT. In this Table, we estimate 
the difference in information leakage following the 13-D filing 
to leakage following the appointment of directors pursuant to a 
settlement for the treatment group only. Specifically, we 
compare leakage between two periods: a “pre” and “post” 
period, defined as follows: 
Pre = [13-D Filing + 7 days, Director Appointment − 7 days] 
Post = [Director Appointment + 7 days, Director Appointment + 
120 days] 
We show the results of OLS regression models in which the 
dependent variable is leaki,t, the leakage for a particular Form 
8-K filing, weighted by . The model is given by the follow-
ing linear specification: 
where postt is an indicator variable equal to 1, if the 8-K filing 
occurred after the director appointment date; and ei,t is a ran-
dom error term.  The coefficient of interest is b1, which captures 
the over-time difference in leakage between the 13-D and set-
tlement date.  We cluster standard errors by firm-event to ad-
just for serial correlation in leakage.  T-statistics are provided 
below correlation coefficients in parentheses.  We use the fol-
lowing indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 
0.01, ** indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10. 
  
   











Post 0.0533** 0.0741*** 0.0488* 0.0651 
(2.22) (2.86) (1.65) (1.51) 
(Intercept) 0.6672*** 0.6673*** 0.6789***  0.6723***
(49.59) (44.89) (45.42) (32.13) 
Observations 7,411 5,758 4,744 3,007 
As Table 8 shows, there is an increase in information leak-
age from the first period (between the Schedule 13-D filing to 
just before the appointment) to the second period (following 
just after the appointment of the activist director).  This in-
crease is statistically significant at the 1% or 5% level in two of 
the four specifications, and at the 10% level in another.  The 
magnitude of the increase is roughly on the order of 5-7 per-
centage points, or 8-11% of the constant term.  These results 
provide further evidence that the increase in leakage is not 
driven solely by the activist engagement per se, but seems to be 
following the appointment of the directors to the board pursu-
ant to the settlement agreement. 
F. Options Trading 
A possible rejoinder to the foregoing evidence of informed 
trading is that much of the communication between a lead 
activist fund and its allies may be innocuous and immaterial. 
For example, a sophisticated trader may ask the activist fund 
“How is your campaign at XYZ Industries going?” and receive 
the non-specific response: “Great! We are making real pro-
gress.”  This response may influence the sophisticated trader to 
buy, but it is probably legally immaterial.  Still, the problem 
with this explanation as a rebuttal to our view that informed 
trading is occurring is that the sophisticated trader needs to 
know with some precision when material information will reach 
and affect the market.  For example, such a trader could not 
sensibly buy a thirty-day option on XYZ Industries, based on 
the above general assurance, because the sophisticated trader 
would not know from it when market-moving news will reach 
the market. 
For an informed trader, options are the most efficient way 
to trade, giving a greater return at a lower cost.  Indeed, a 
number of studies have established that informed traders are 
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active in the options market88 and that options prices do pre-
dict future stock returns.89  For our purposes, it is particularly 
useful to focus on how informed traders trade in the options 
market.  The best evidence here is that they prefer to take long 
positions only in anticipation of unscheduled news releases 
and that they avoid trading on scheduled news events (such as 
earnings releases).90  Form 8-K filings are, by definition, un-
scheduled news releases (which must generally be filed within 
four business days after a defined event occurs).  Thus, if we 
find profitable trading in the options market based on trades 
entered into prior to a Form 8-K filing, this would be consistent 
with the general pattern of informed trading in the options 
market.  But given the short timing requirements for the filing 
of a Form 8-K, a trader cannot expect to profit from thirty-day 
options based only on vague, immaterial gossip.  One must 
trade quickly to profit from advance knowledge of the content of 
a prospective Form 8-K filing, and this requires that the trader 
know approximately when the announcement will occur.  Fur-
ther, a general sense that things are going well (or poorly) does 
not imply that there will soon be any filing (and certainly not a 
Form 8-K filing) that will move the market price.  To sum up, 
the trader must have hard and specific information (including 
as to the announcement date) to profit from trading on options. 
In that light, we examined whether there is greater trading 
in stock options of target firms following an activist settlement 
agreement.  Because there may be hundreds or even 
thousands of stock option contracts written on any given firm’s 
stock over time, it was necessary to employ a specially focused 
form of analysis. We downloaded options data from the Op-
tionsMetrics IvyDB database only for firms which executed an 
activist settlement and divided these options into two groups, 
limiting our analysis to a window of one year on either side of 
the settlement agreement. 
The first group consists of options written on settlement 
firms which “overlap” a Form 8-K disclosure.  By “overlap,” we 
88 See Jun Pan & Allen M. Poteshman, The Information in Option Volume for 
Future Stock Prices, 19 REV. FIN. STUD. 871 (2006); Martijn Cremers, Andrew Fodor 
& David Weinbaum, How Do Informed Option Traders Trade? Option Trading 
Activity, News Releases, and Stock Return Predictability, (last revised Sept. 21, 
2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2544344 [https:/ 
/perma.cc/4JJM-VDBB] (surveying literature on informed trading in options 
market). 
89 See Martijn Cremers & David Weinbaum, Deviations from Put-Call Parity 
and Stock Return Predictability, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 335, 337 (2010). 
90 See Cremers, Fodor & Weinbaum, supra note 88, at 24.  Earnings releases 
are both scheduled and generally released on a Form 10-Q. 
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mean that the option price is quoted before the Form 8-K filing 
but the option expires after the Form 8-K was subsequently 
filed.  For example, suppose that the Form 8-K is filed on Janu-
ary 10.  An option that is quoted on January 1 and expires on 
January 31 would “overlap” the Form 8-K.  An option that ex-
pires on January 9 would not overlap the Form 8-K; neither 
would any option that is quoted on January 11.  The second 
group consists of options written on settlement firms which do 
not overlap a Form 8-K disclosure. 
An increase in trading volume for options that overlap a 
Form 8-K disclosure is consistent with trading on the basis of 
material nonpublic information.  On average, these options in-
crease in value upon the filing of the Form 8-K disclosure. 
Then, we employ regression analysis to compare the difference 
in trading volume between overlapping and non-overlapping 
options, before and after the directors are appointed to the 
board pursuant to the settlement agreement.  We present these 
“difference in differences” results in Table 9. 
TABLE 9. EFFECTS OF ACTIVIST SETTLEMENTS ON OPTIONS TRADING 
(TREATMENT ONLY).  In this Table, we estimate the difference in 
the over-time change in options trading between options which 
overlap a Form 8-K filing and those that do not overlap a Form 
8-K filing. This Table reports the results of a difference-in-
differences specification, which we estimate by ordinary least 
squares as follows: 
where voli,t is the trading volume in option i as of month t; di is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if an option overlaps a Form 8-K 
disclosure; postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if month t is 
after the director appointment date; xi,t is a vector of time-
varying option covariates: option strike price, delta, gamma, 
vega, and implied volatility; fi is a fixed effect for firm i; and ei,t is 
a random error term.  The coefficient of interest is b3, which 
captures the over-time difference in log trading volume between 
the two groups.  We cluster standard errors by option to ad-
dress serial correlation in trading volume.  We use the following 
indicators of statistical significance: *** indicates p < 0.01, ** 
indicates p < 0.05, and * indicates p < 0.10. 
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Log of Log of Log of Log of 
Trading Trading Trading Trading
Volume Volume Volume Volume 
(no controls) (some (more (all controls) 
controls) controls) 
Overlapping -0.8144*** -0.8178*** -0.2481*** -0.2329***
(Difference from 
Non-Overlapping) 
(t-statistic) (-32.69) (-33.36) (-9.11) (-8.58) 
Post (Difference -0.4264*** -0.5230*** -0.3921*** -0.4203***
from Pre) 
(t-statistic) (-15.95) (-19.34) (-14.39) (-15.47) 
Overlapping x 0.2318*** 0.2780*** 0.1503*** 0.1685*** 
Post (Difference 
in Differences) 
(t-statistic) (6.84) (8.27) (4.66) (5.25) 
Strike Price (Log) -0.4942*** -0.0575*  0.2791***
(t-statistic)  (-15.14) (-1.82) (7.67) 
Option Delta 0.2763***  0.3289***  0.3371***
(t-statistic)  (15.37) (19.96) (20.56) 
Option Gamma 1.8129***  2.0393***
(t-statistic) (23.41) (25.41) 
Option Vega -0.0592*** -0.0574***
(t-statistic) (-32.43) (-31.77) 
Implied Volatility 1.2712***
(t-statistic) (18.42) 
(Intercept) 4.1628***  9.2969***  4.5731***  0.5585
(t-statistic) (199.57) (27.26) (13.76) (1.41) 
Observations  251,450 251,450 251,450 251,450 
In Table 9, the bold-faced row labeled “Treatment x Post 
(Difference in Differences)” shows that settlement firms experi-
ence an over-time increase of 16-23 log points in trading vol-
ume, on average, of options that overlap Form 8-K filings, as 
compared to those that do not overlap Form 8-K filings.  This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level.  This evi-
dence is consistent with the conjectures that tippees had spe-
cific information and knew approximately when it would be 
released to the market. 
G. Effect on Bid-Ask Spreads 
Next, we consider whether bid-ask spreads widen following 
activist settlements that lead to the appointment of directors to 
the target company’s board, consistent with the theoretical pre-
dictions described in this Article.  To do so, we obtained 
monthly bid-ask spreads from CRSP for each of the stocks in 
our treatment and control groups, following the same method 
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as discussed above for calculating the “director appointment 
date” for each control group.  For consistency with the leakage 
analysis, we exclude a 21-day window immediately preceding 
and following the settlement (though our results change very 
little if these days are included).  To ensure our results are not 
driven by differences in bid-ask spreads arising far from the 
settlement, we limit the sample to monthly bid-ask spreads 
within short windows around the settlement date: 90, 120, 150 
and 180 calendar days. Table 10 presents the results. 
TABLE 10. ACTIVIST  SETTLEMENTS AND BID-ASK  SPREADS. In this 
Table, we estimate the difference in the over-time change in 
bid-ask spreads between the treatment and the control groups. 
This Table reports the results of a difference-in-differences 
specification, which we estimate by ordinary least squares as 
follows, weighting by the propensity-score weight: 
where spreadi,t is the bid-ask spread divided by the closing 
price of firm i’s stock at month t; di is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the firm appointed an activist director pursuant to a 
settlement agreement; postt is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
month t is after the director appointment date; and ei,t is a 
random error term.  The coefficient of interest is b3, which cap-
tures the over-time difference in bid—ask spreads between the 
two groups.  We cluster standard errors by firm to address 
serial correlation in spreads. 
    
 
    
  













Treatment -0.0023* -0.0021* -0.0014 -0.0011 
(t-statistic) (-1.68) (-1.73) (-1.26) (-1.16) 
Post -0.0029** -0.0025*** -0.0022*** -0.0020***
(t-statistic) (-2.55) (-2.58) (-2.62) (-2.77) 
Treatment x Post 0.0033** 0.0034*** 0.0033*** 0.0035*** 
(t-statistic) (2.58) (2.97) (3.16) (3.67) 
(Intercept) 0.0086*** 0.0083***  0.0076***  0.0074***
(7.02) (8.06) (8.47) (9.51) 
Observations 9,252 13,195 20,910 32,576 
In Table 10, the bold-faced row labeled “Treatment x Post 
(Difference in Differences)” shows that settlement firms experi-
ence an over-time average increase of 0.33-0.35 percentage 
points in the bid-ask spread for each individual trade.  This 
difference is statistically significant at the 1% level in most 
specifications.  To get a sense for the magnitude of this effect, 
we multiply the monthly raw bid-ask spread for each firm’s 
stock by the number of shares traded in that month and obtain 
an average difference-in-differences increase of $43,325 per 
firm-month-event in the “Treatment x Post” group for the six-
month specification [-180, -21] vs. [+21, +180]. Multiplying by 
n=8,034 firm-month-events in the “Treatment x Post” group 
yields a total approximate increase of $348 million in bid-ask 
spreads over this six-month period window. 
Finally, we note that, although the point estimates for this 
difference may seem relatively small, as Glosten & Putnins 
point out,91 the social welfare losses associated with an effect 
like this one can be magnified by the downstream effects of 
91 See Lawrence R. Glosten & Talis J. Putnins, Welfare Costs of Informed 
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expanded bid-ask spreads in hindering—or making excessively 
expensive—mutually beneficial transactions.  This result is 
consistent with the possibility that, whatever the private bene-
fits obtained by directors or others following activist settle-
ments, these benefits come with a corresponding social cost: 
wider bid-ask spreads that potentially deprive other investors 
of transactions in the company’s stock that would otherwise 
occur.  While we recognize that there is substantial uncertainty 
regarding the precise magnitude of this social cost, our findings 
do suggest that the use of activist settlement agreements—and 
the access to the boardroom that comes with them—carries a 
cost for public-company investors. 
III 
IMPLICATIONS OF FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE REFORMS 
A. Informed Trading and Hedge Fund Activism 
What is driving hedge fund activism?  Is it just that activist 
funds are maximizing value for their fellow shareholders?  Or is 
there more?  In a simple model of activism, activists’ funds gain 
or lose based on the stock prices of the target firms in which 
they invest.  If the activist fund buys stock in the target firm, 
pushes for changes in its operations, staff or business model, 
and, in response, the target’s stock price rises, few would deny 
that the activist benefitted the other shareholders.  But if ac-
tivist engagements culminating in the appointment of fund-
nominated directors are accompanied by informed trading 
(whether or not unlawful), then activism is receiving a second 
source of profit—in effect a special subsidy from informed trad-
ing.  Thus, some activist engagements may be motivated (at 
least on the margin) not simply by efficiency considerations, 
but by the knowledge that the appointment of a director will 
give them access to material, nonpublic information.  If this 
subsidy from informed trading is significant, it should logically 
cause an increase in the number of activist engagements, even 
if these engagements did not produce value for the other share-
holders.  To illustrate, suppose an activist fund expends 
$100,000 (which is not reimbursed) over a six-month period 
and eventually appoints two directors to the target’s board. 
Assume further that the stock price moves up and down in a 
volatile fashion over the six-month period following their ap-
pointment to the board, but ultimately no long-term increase in 
the target’s stock price results. Shareholders in this target thus 
gain nothing (and probably bear some costs in the form of the 
legal expenses incurred by their company and the diverted ex-
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ecutive time).  Assume finally that the activist (or its allies) 
make $500,000 in profits from informed stock trading in the 
secondary market over this interval.  As a result, the entire 
transaction produces no gain for shareholders generally (and 
probably produces some social waste), but it does yield a signif-
icant private benefit.  When private gains cause public waste 
the result is socially inefficient. 
The bottom line is that pervasive access to material, non-
public information gives rise to an invisible subsidy to activism 
that logically should both inflate the rate of activist engage-
ments and encourage (on the margin) at least some otherwise 
inefficient engagements (such as the one discussed above) that 
do not generate value for the other shareholders (but do gener-
ate profits for the informed traders).  To be sure, this does not 
mean that hedge fund activism is itself undesirable or ineffi-
cient, but only that it is receiving a perverse subsidy. 
Still, how is this subsidy received and allocated?  Normally, 
the activist signs a standstill agreement with the target firm.92 
But this may be less a barrier than it first appears, for several 
reasons.  First, standstill agreements generally do not prevent 
short selling or trading in put and call options (which are the 
least costly way of exploiting material nonpublic information). 
Second, although private settlement agreements vary substan-
tially in the restrictions they impose, most do not expressly bar 
trading by the activist’s employees or agents, and relatively few 
require the target company’s consent to the sharing of confi-
92 As noted earlier, the Bebchuk study finds that a standstill provision in 
settlement agreements is “almost universal.”  Bebchuk et al., supra note 14, at 6. 
Still, the standstill level may be above the current level of the activist fund’s 
ownership (thus allowing it to buy more). See supra note 38 and accompanying 
text. 
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dential information.93  Nonetheless, other factors appear to dis-
suade the hedge fund from such trading.94 
Even if the activist fund does not itself trade in the target’s 
stock, its employees and allies may feel less constrained and 
might trade through hidden agents.  Still, these agreements 
also do not typically make the activist liable for the trading by 
their employees, advisors, or other tippees; instead, they often 
only recite a formula that effectively states that each side 
knows the law.95  In contrast, the directors nominated by activ-
ists are probably the group least likely to trade, both because of 
their visibility and clear fiduciary status and because of Section 
16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which requires public 
disclosure through a filing with the SEC of purchases and sales 
93 From our review of settlement agreements, the vast majority do not explic-
itly prohibit the directors or the hedge fund from trading in either options or the 
common stock of the target firm (although some do restrict trading in any deriva-
tives of the target’s stock, including put and call options, and some do restrict 
short selling).  That said, there are several factors which make it difficult for the 
hedge fund itself to profit from informed trading on open-market stock trades. 
First, there is generally an effective upper bound on the amount of stock the 
activist may acquire.  Many settlement agreements contain a standstill percent-
age somewhat above the current level of the activist’s ownership, which higher 
level the activist agrees to not to exceed.  Even where a settlement does not specify 
a standstill percentage, very few activists are willing to cross the 10% ownership 
threshold, in part because of the added requirements and penalties imposed by 
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act, which apply to any 10% holder regard-
less of whether it has a nominee on the board.  In addition, the 10% level is 
avoided because it is often “socially acceptable” to put a poison pill in place with a 
10% threshold, as owning more than 10% is generally viewed as a prelude to a 
takeover/sale attempt.  Also, if the hedge fund increases its position in the target 
by more than 1%, it is required to amend its Schedule 13-D and promptly disclose 
this increased holding. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2(a) (2018).  This may attract 
undesired scrutiny if the activist is trading on nonpublic information.  For these 
reasons, activists are unlikely to directly increase their long positions substan-
tially after signing the standstill, though such trades can obviously still occur 
within and up to these bounds. 
94 See discussion supra at note 93. 
95 Frequently, the settlement agreement will provide: “Each of the Investors 
hereby acknowledges that it is aware that the United States securities laws pro-
hibit any person who has material, nonpublic information with respect to the 
Company from transacting in the securities of the Company or from communicat-
ing such information to any other person under circumstances in which it is 
reasonably foreseeable that such person is likely to transact in such securities.” 
Dillard’s Inc., Information to be Included in Statements Filed Pursuant to Rule 13d-
1(a) and Amendments Thereto Filed Pursuant to Rule 13d-2(a) (Schedule 13-D) 40 
(Apr. 1, 2008).  Here, three activist funds and their affiliates state that they recog-
nize what the law requires, but make no guarantees or contractual commitments. 
At a minimum, a large number of persons are here acquiring material, nonpublic 
information.  We have found this format to be widely used.  In our view, these are 
self-serving provisions that permit the activist investor to express shock and 
dismay (but incur no liability) if one of its advisors or employees later misbehaves 
and tips others. 
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by directors, and requires the director to surrender any “short-
swing” profits to the corporation.96 
More plausible then is trading by tippees of the activist or 
its employees.  If the hedge fund or its employees share mate-
rial, nonpublic information acquired from access to the target’s 
board with the fellow members of its “wolf pack” of allies, the 
trading by these allies would be harder to detect and legally 
more difficult to prosecute.  Alternatively, employees of the 
hedge fund may just enjoy gossiping with professional col-
leagues, possibly anticipating that their sharing of information 
will earn them reciprocal favors in the future.  This implicit 
view of Wall Street as a giant “favor bank” seems consistent 
with the facts of some recent cases, including Newman, where 
tippees working for one hedge fund have shared nonpublic in-
formation with colleagues in other funds.97  Finally, under 
some circumstances, the activist fund’s tipping might be per-
fectly lawful.  For example, if the activist fund secures a prom-
ise of confidentiality from another investor, a SEC rule permits 
it to share confidential, nonpublic information with that inves-
tor, and the tipper may sometimes have a legitimate corporate 
justification for such information sharing.98  If the activist ob-
tains such a promise, it can later claim that it acted entirely 
96 See 18 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (2018).  Section 16(b) requires a director to file Form 
4 and Form 5 with the SEC.  Form 4 must be filed by “the end of the second 
business day following the day on which the subject transaction has been exe-
cuted.” See 17 C.F.R. § 240.16a-3(g)(1) (2018).  Moreover, upon the acquisition or 
disposition of 1% or more of the common, the activist must file an amendment to 
Schedule 13-D listing all trades in the common that occurred within the past 60 
days.  And any activist that becomes subject to Section 16—either through 10% 
ownership or having an employee on the company board—must file trades on 
Form 4.  Thus, a great deal of an activist’s trading activity in the stock will be 
publicly reported, especially where the fund has an employee on the board.  In our 
dataset, we found that there was little to no suspicious trading reported on either 
the Schedule 13-D/As or Form 4s, strengthening the conclusion that activists or 
their employees are more likely to be tipping rather than trading directly on 
material nonpublic information. 
97 In United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 448 (2d Cir. 2014), the defend-
ants were fourth and fifth level “remote” tippees and the information moved from 
employees in one fund to those in another fund, seemingly as a gift.  Although 
Newman is no longer good law in the light of later decisions, the fact pattern 
illustrates how information flows within the industry and suggests that a norm of 
reciprocity may encourage information sharing. 
98 For example, if the activist fund is trying to organize a proxy contest it may 
be in the best interests of the fund’s investors for its managers to share informa-
tion about its plans with prospective allies to maximize its leverage over the target 
firm.  The goal of winning a majority vote in a proxy fight requires it to search for 
allies and explain its reasoning.  Regulation Fair Disclosure explicitly recognizes 
that material nonpublic information may be shared with those who agree to 
preserve its confidentiality. See 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2018) (providing that 
Regulation FD does not apply to a disclosure to a person “who expressly agrees to 
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lawfully and was “shocked” to learn that its tippee acted 
unlawfully.99 
Ambiguity surrounds the potential motivations for an ac-
tivist fund to share confidential information acquired through 
an employee serving on a target board.  Sometimes, it could be, 
as just noted, an expectation of reciprocity (“I will tip you on my 
deals, if you tip me on yours”).  Sometimes, it may just be 
casual gossip among traders seeking to impress each other 
with their knowledge.  Still another possibility is that such 
sharing could be an attempt to hold together a coalition of 
funds for a longer period.  If the lead activist fund can assemble 
a coalition (or “wolf pack” in the popular parlance) of funds 
holding somewhere between 15% and 20% of the target’s voting 
stock, it would have a considerable advantage over the target’s 
management in any subsequent proxy fight.  Facing such odds, 
target management may prefer to settle than to fight.  But why 
do these allies join this coalition or remain in it?  Of course, 
they could believe in the lead activist’s strategy.  Another possi-
bility is that they will support the activist in return for access to 
material, nonpublic information.  Here, it is important to un-
derstand that the target firm’s stock price does not normally 
increase significantly after the initial price bump following the 
activist’s disclosure of its position with its initial Schedule 13-D 
filing.  One empirical study shows that a measurable price in-
crease after this filing usually occurs only if there is a subse-
quent “successful outcome” (i.e., a merger or sale 
transaction).100  This implies that the other members of the 
activist’s coalition who buy prior to the initial Schedule 13-D 
filing may have a reduced incentive to continue to hold the 
maintain the disclosed information in confidence”).  Of course, those who promise 
confidentiality may not comply (or they may tip others who do not comply). 
99 We have found examples among the settlement agreements we surveyed 
where, to share confidential information, the activist fund only had to advise its 
tippee that the information that it provided was confidential. See supra note 56. 
If such a tippee then traded, the tipper could claim surprise and dismay.  To be 
sure, the tipper’s expression of shock at trading by the tippee may not be convinc-
ing, but the burden is on the prosecution to show that the tipper expected the 
tippee to disregard its confidentiality obligation. 
100 See Marco Becht et al., Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An International 
Study, (Last revised on May 22, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm 
?abstract_id=2376271 [https://perma.cc/DP36-FUJF] (finding that stock price of 
the target only appreciates significantly after the initial jump on the filing of the 
Schedule 13-D if there is a “successful outcome,” such as a merger, takeover bid 
or major asset sale).  Because these transactions are uncertain and often delayed, 
the activist’s allies in the “wolf pack” could decide to bail out and sell their shares 
if they do not continue to receive encouraging advice or some other benefit (such 
as nonpublic material information) that motivates them to hold their shares. 
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target’s stock after that Schedule 13-D filing, particularly if the 
prospect of such a merger or sale outcome is uncertain or 
diminishing.  Thus, absent some other incentive, these allies 
might logically sell their individual positions after the initial 
stock bump (and move on to a new target).  But access to mate-
rial, nonpublic information is an additional and powerful in-
centive that can motivate these allies to hold onto their 
positions in the target (and thus enhance the activist’s voting 
power).  Also, it is logical to anticipate that there will be market-
moving announcements (positive or negative) in the near fu-
ture, given the activist’s announced plans. 
Indeed, if access to nonpublic material information is a 
likely consequence of joining the activist’s coalition, there may 
be cases in which activist investors join a coalition, even 
though they doubt the wisdom of the lead activist’s proposals. 
If so, this may imply in turn that a moral-hazard problem could 
arise, as the supporters of activist engagements may not truly 
need to evaluate carefully the merits of the activist’s proposals 
if these trading gains are also available. 
To be clear, we do not know that investors think or behave 
in this way.  But we do know that someone is trading actively 
and disproportionately once a hedge fund insider goes on the 
board.  Equally important, we know that the market seems to 
expect such trading, which is why the bid/ask spread widens 
on the appointment of a hedge fund employee to the board.  To 
ignore the market’s standard reaction is to wear a self-imposed 
blindfold. 
To sum up, even if we do not know whether illegality is 
occurring, we have evidence that informed trading is common 
and thus that a dubious subsidy may fuel hedge fund activism 
on the margin.  The gains to those engaged in informed trading 
are matched by an agency cost to other shareholders: the 
widening of the bid/ask spread.  In fairness, one cannot yet 
reliably estimate the size of this subsidy.  All that is clear is that 
the desire for access to nonpublic information is strong and 
could motivate some to join an activist coalition and support 
the lead activist regardless of their view of the quality of the 
lead activist’s plans.  Access to nonpublic information could be 
the social cement that holds together an otherwise unstable 
coalition. 
B. Preempting the Majority’s Preference 
The heyday of hedge fund activism began a decade or so 
ago when traditional institutional investors (who are typically 
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diversified, often indexed, and generally passive) began to sup-
port the proposals advanced by activist hedge funds.  That sup-
port enabled hedge funds typically holding less than 10% of an 
issuer’s stock to compel management to negotiate with them 
for fear of losing a hostile proxy fight in which the diversified 
institutional investors would vote to support the undiversified 
hedge funds. 
But more recently that alliance has come under strain.  A 
fissure has clearly developed between hedge fund activists and 
an institutional investor community that fears the short-term 
bias of activism.  As noted earlier, the three largest institutional 
shareholders are Vanguard, BlackRock, and State Street, 
which collectively hold 18.4% of the stock in S&P 500 compa-
nies.101  Over recent years, “passive investors” have greatly in-
creased their share in the ownership of large U.S. corporations 
such that the top ten institutional shareholders, most of whom 
fall into this “passive” category, now hold roughly 32% of the 
stock in S&P 500 companies.102  Unlike activist hedge funds, 
these institutions have regularly expressed disagreement with 
the goals of activists.  In particular, the CEOs of BlackRock and 
Vanguard sent much-publicized letters in 2015 to their fellow 
CEOs at large-cap companies urging them not to take the 
short-term view advocated by activist hedge funds.103  Then in 
2016, these institutions and others agreed with major corpora-
tions on statements of corporate governance principles that 
sought to shift the focus away from short-term results.104 
101 LAZARD (2018), supra note 4, at 8. 
102 Id. 
103 See Laurence D. Fink, Larry Fink’s 2016 Corporate Governance Letter to 
CEOs, BLACKROCK (Feb. 1, 2016), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/ 
literature/press-release/2016-larry-fink-ceo-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/BY2Z-
L9PX]; Laurence D. Fink, Larry Fink’s Annual Letter to CEOs: A Sense of Purpose, 
BLACKROCK (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/inves-
tor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter [https://perma.cc/2VWZ-PS4E]; F. William 
McNabb III, An Open Letter to Directors of Public Companies Worldwide, VANGUARD 
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/govern-
ance-letter-to-companies.pdf [https://perma.cc/J82B-2E8B]; F. William McNabb 
III, Letter to the Independent Leaders of the Boards of Directors of the Vanguard 
Funds’ Largest Portfolio Holdings, VANGUARD (Feb. 27, 2015), https:// 
about.vanguard.com/investment-stewardship/CEO_Letter_03_02_ext.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/QZU8-GAWZ]. 
104 The leading example is “Commonsense Corporate Governance Principles,” 
a statement adopted in July 2016 by a coalition of nineteen CEOs (including 
Warren Buffett and the CEOs of General Motors and J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.) 
and the CEOs of several major investment firms (including BlackRock). See Com-
monsense Corporate Governance Principles, GOVERNANCEPRINCIPLES.ORG, http:// 
www.governanceprinciples.org; [https://perma.cc/BQ9G-5Y39] (last visited Oct. 
29, 2018); see also Yaron Nili, Out of Sight, out of Mind: The Case for Improving 
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Later in 2016, State Street Global Advisors (SSGA) shifted 
the focus from substantive goals to procedures, releasing an 
elaborate statement criticizing the willingness of corporations 
engaged by activists to enter into quick and private settlements 
with activists without first seeking the input of long-term 
shareholders (such as, of course, themselves).105  SSGA was 
clearly on to something here; it saw that risk-averse managers 
would rather concede two directors to activists than take the 
risk of a hostile proxy contest and possibly a humiliating de-
feat.  As SSGA pointed out, less than 10% of board seats con-
ceded in activist campaigns in 2015 and 2016 had resulted 
from a proxy contest (as opposed to 34% in 2014);106 the other 
seats were resolved through private negotiations between the 
company and the activists. 
SSGA objected to the process surrounding these agree-
ments even more than to their substance (which they saw as 
inducing the company to focus on the short-term).  Procedur-
ally, SSGA and its clients believed themselves to be disen-
franchised by these private settlements.  In its 2016 statement, 
SSGA made several specific proposals as to the duration of 
such agreements, the requisite holding period for shares held 
by activists, the pledging of activist shares, and the need for 
fund-nominated directors to resign in certain circum-
stances.107  Procedurally, SSGA announced they would engage 
with companies ex post to evaluate these settlements.  Unfortu-
nately, this resembles locking the barn door after the horse has 
Director Independence Disclosure, 43 J. CORP. L. 35, 37 (2017) (discussing this 
coalition statement). 
105 See Protecting Long-Term Shareholder Interests in Activist Engagements, 
supra note 5, at 2. 
106 Id. 
107 Specifically, SSGA objected to the following: 
Duration.  SSGA estimated that the duration of most settlement 
agreements ran from six to eighteen months, and it suggested that 
the agreements continue for a longer period (but it did not specify 
the proposed duration). 
Share Holding Periods.  SSGA argued that “an activist firm should 
be required to hold its shares for long periods from the date of the 
settlement to align them with longer-termed shareholders.” Id. at 2. 
Minimum Ownership Thresholds.  SSGA objected to reduction of the 
activist’s stake in the target and asked companies to require direc-
tors nominated by activists to tender their resignations if the activ-
ists’ ownership level fell below a required minimum threshold. 
Restrictions on Pledging.  SSGA would limit both short sales and 
pledging of shares by activists, conduct which it said could endan-
ger the company’s stock price. 
Executive Compensation.  SSGA objected to using earnings per 
share as the primary determinant of CEO compensation. 
See Id. 
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been stolen.  Once a financial engineering strategy has been 
undertaken or activist directors appointed, these steps are not 
easily reversed. 
Thus, although SSGA’s critique won much applause, it did 
not outline a feasible strategy for the future and managements 
engaged by activists would predictably continue to take the 
course of least resistance and settle privately.  Accordingly, the 
next Part will focus on feasible strategies, both to protect the 
long-term shareholder from disenfranchisement and to reduce 
the subsidy that informed trading may be providing to fuel 
activism. 
C. Practical Reforms 
Two basic problems have been identified to this point: (1) 
Informed trading may represent a hidden subsidy for activism, 
which could inflate (on the margin) the rate of activism and 
justify support for activist proposals of dubious merit; and (2) 
Long-term shareholders (largely diversified pension and mu-
tual funds, but also exchange traded funds) may be disen-
franchised if risk-averse managements would rather privately 
settle with the activist than undertake a risky fight or enter into 
broader negotiations with all the shareholders.  On the as-
sumption that legislation is unlikely (and Congress dysfunc-
tional), this Part will focus on self-help reforms and possible 
SEC rules on the premise that the least drastic means should 
be preferred. 
1. Protecting Against Disenfranchisement 
Let’s start with a realistic assumption: once an activist 
appears and “engages” a target company, that company’s man-
agement cannot be trusted to side with the majority of the 
shareholders.  Management wants to avoid a costly public 
proxy fight that it could lose and that would likely result in its 
eventual ouster.  Thus, it is prepared to reach a weak, Neville 
Chamberlain-like compromise in which it will offer two seats on 
its board for “peace in our time.”  In reality, much as in Neville 
Chamberlain’s case, management seldom gets the peace it 
sought because the appointment of activist directors is regu-
larly followed by the departure of the CEO within a year or 
two.108  Still, management can hope, and so they settle. 
108 A study by FTI Consulting in 2016 found that CEO turnover when activist 
nominees gain board seats was 34.1% and 55.1% over the one and two-year 
period, respectively, following the board appointments.  The normal CEO turnover 
rates are 16.6% and 30.9% over one and two-year periods, respectively. See 
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Corporate managers also have more reason to fear hedge 
fund activists than diversified investors, even if the latter hold 
more stock.  This is because undiversified hedge funds hold a 
small portfolio (in terms of number of companies held), but 
take large positions in each, tend to focus on only one or two 
campaigns at a time, and have shown in the past that they will 
undertake the costs of a proxy fight.  In contrast, diversified 
investors typically own smaller stakes in hundreds of stocks, 
have modest staffs, and are unlikely to take action with respect 
to an individual stock that represents only a small proportion 
of their portfolio.  They may vote for or against the activist, but 
they are reluctant to incur costs. 
In this light, it is impractical to expect even an SSGA to 
take a seat on any of the hundreds of boards that have reason 
to fear an activist attack in the near future.  SSGA does not 
have sufficient qualified staff to cover the entire corporate wa-
terfront and monitor closely all the companies in its portfolio. 
Indeed, even if a corporation were to ask SSGA to place a repre-
sentative on its board (in order to signal the corporation’s will-
ingness to resist activists), SSGA (or a similar firm) might 
logically decline because the presence of an SSGA employee on 
a corporation’s board could restrict its ability to sell that stock 
(for fear of insider trading liability).  Passive investors are pas-
sive because they logically prefer liquidity to control.109 
What then can we realistically expect of diversified institu-
tional investors?  Here are two possibilities: First, investors, 
such as SSGA and BlackRock, who fear they are being disen-
franchised by private settlements could form (with other simi-
larly-minded institutions) a steering committee and assemble a 
team of outside directors (who are not their employees) that 
they could seek to place on corporate boards in the event of an 
activist attack.  This would take some advance preparation, but 
the effort and expense could be shared among the dozen (or 
more) institutions participating in such a committee.  This 
committee could contact the corporation at the outset of an 
activist campaign to suggest either its own nominees or its 
desire to be involved in the settlement process.  Some corpora-
Sonali Basak & Beth Jinks, Activist Investors Double Chance of CEO Exits, Study 
Shows, BLOOMBERG (Sep. 21, 2016, 8:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-09-21/activist-investors-double-chance-of-ceo-exits-study-
shows [https://perma.cc/D59P-VM2P]. 
109 One of the authors has made this argument at considerable length else-
where. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor 
as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991).  Hedge Funds, being rela-
tively undiversified, are an exception to this generalization. 
444 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:381 
tions would not welcome this development (as it would compli-
cate their negotiations), but others might see it as giving 
management more negotiating leverage.  This committee would 
have no authority to bind its members and would act only 
when it had the support of a majority of its members. 
Second, diversified investors, working with ISS or a similar 
body, could adopt a shareholder-approved bylaw that would 
preclude board action either to expand the board’s size or elect 
persons to vacancies on the board under certain circum-
stances.  For example, such a bylaw might seek to restrict such 
board action in cases where a requisite percentage of the share-
holders objected.  Consider then a bylaw that applied only if, 
after an activist filed a Schedule 13-D or otherwise “engaged” 
the company, shareholders representing a larger ownership 
stake than that announced by the activist in its Schedule 13-D 
were to file a written demand with the corporation within a 
specified period, asking the board not to settle with the activist 
by appointing its nominees.  In effect, such a bylaw would bar 
private settlements and require that the matter be settled in-
stead by a shareholder vote at the annual meeting (unless a 
majority of the objecting shareholders later withdrew their de-
mand).  The core idea here is that in the event of an activist 
engagement the diversified shareholders could seek to block 
private settlements (without their consent) if they filed a de-
mand supported by a larger percentage of shares than the ac-
tivists held.  The filing of such a demand would effectively 
assert that the activists did not represent the “silent majority” 
of the shareholders.  This bylaw would provide that it could 
only be amended by shareholder action, but procedures could 
be further specified in the bylaw so that these shareholders 
could withdraw their demand if an acceptable compromise 
were reached among the activists, the diversified shareholders, 
and corporate management.  In reality, such a shareholder de-
mand would be intended to start a three-way negotiation be-
tween the activists, the “silent majority,” and management. 
Inevitably, there are some legal issues here, but they can 
be largely solved or outflanked.110  In any event, most corporate 
110 First and foremost is the possibility that a shareholder-adopted bylaw may 
be deemed invalid (at least in Delaware) if it fails to contain language or a provi-
sion reserving to the corporation’s directors their power to fulfill their fiduciary 
duties and reach a private settlement in a specific case. See CA, Inc. v. AFSCME 
Emps. Pension Plan, 953 A.2d 227, 240 (Del. 2008) (determining that shareholder 
approved bylaws may not usurp the board’s power to exercise its fiduciary duty). 
Several answers are possible to this objection.  First, language could be inserted 
giving the board such power, but only after they fully consulted with the share-
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managements would find it difficult simply to rebuff or chal-
lenge such a demand.  This demand procedure would give the 
diversified investor community both flexibility and leverage, as 
they could first meet with management and negotiate for their 
own candidate or candidates to join the board, turning to the 
demand procedure only if they were left unsatisfied.  A percep-
tive corporate management might welcome (and even adopt) 
such a bylaw because it would be a clear signal to activists that 
they would encounter stiff resistance at such a company.111 
This signal might deter some activist engagements, and that 
may be an important virtue of this bylaw. 
2. Restricting Informed Trading 
Information leakage can injure the corporation and its 
shareholders in at least two ways: First, premature disclosure 
may disable the corporation from exploiting opportunities or 
solving business problems, which it could have done if it had 
more time.  The facts of the famous Texas Gulf Sulphur case 
illustrate this problem, as heavy insider trading forced the 
company to disclose its extraordinary ore strike before it could 
buy the mineral rights on the land surrounding its test drill 
holes.112  In other cases, misappropriated information may be 
seized and exploited by others (including rival firms), again 
injuring the corporation.  Second, even if premature disclosure 
does not injure the corporation, informed trading in the corpo-
holders filing the demand.  Second, if corporate management sensibly realized 
that such a provision insulated them, they could themselves amend the certificate 
of incorporation to add the same provision (which would then no longer be subject 
to such a legal challenge).  Or, the board could amend the bylaws themselves 
(which arguably should be effective).  Even if the bylaw could not be fully enforced, 
it could still have considerable impact on a corporation that did not want to offend 
its “permanent shareholders.”  A second problem is that the solicitation of share-
holders to sign such a written demand might be deemed a solicitation subject to 
the proxy rules.  However, several exemptions from the proxy rules seem available 
here.  Rule 14a-2(b)(2) exempts solicitations “where the total number of persons 
solicited is not more than ten.”  17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-2(b)(2) (2018).  Less than ten 
institutional investors could easily hold 7% or 8% of the issuer’s stock.  Also, 
those asking institutional investors to sign such a demand could claim the ex-
emption afforded by Rule 14a-2(b)(1) because they would not be seeking proxy 
authority.  The bottom line is that the legal problems here can be solved. 
111 Of course, one impact of such a bylaw or charter provision might be to 
cause activists to directly approach the institutional investor community and 
work out their proposal with them before approaching the company.  But this is 
desirable. 
112 SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc). 
Essentially, this case held that the SEC could sue corporate managers who traded 
after a major ore discovery but before its disclosure, but the company’s disclosure 
of the strike, which was hastened by its managers’ trading, precluded it from fully 
realizing all the gains from its discovery. 
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ration’s stock causes its bid/ask spread to widen and this cost 
falls on all shareholders.  Indeed, even those shareholders who 
do not trade bear it indirectly because it raises the cost of 
capital to the corporation.  Small as this cost may be in individ-
ual transactions, the aggregate cost across the market could be 
large. 
One response to the evidence earlier noted that informed 
trading occurs regularly once activist nominees (and particu-
larly activist employees) are appointed to the board is to say: 
enforce the law!  If this is unlawful, then arguably there should 
be criminal prosecutions.  But that response, while under-
standable, may be too simple.  There are both legal uncertain-
ties and enormous problems of proof in relying on criminal 
sanctions or SEC civil enforcement.  Prosecutorial resources 
are limited and also subject to periodic reallocation.  This Part 
will briefly survey these problems and then turn to a proposed 
rule change that would expand the definition of “group” under 
the Williams Act, in part in order to simplify insider trading 
enforcement. 
1. Legal Uncertainties.  Much trading by hedge funds who 
are planning an engagement with a corporation appears to be 
lawful.  For example, assume that one activist hedge fund (the 
Mars Fund) tells five other funds that it is planning to file a 
Schedule 13-D in two weeks with respect to Widget Corp., 
which document would list its demands, including that Wid-
get’s CEO be replaced.  All parties to this communication un-
derstand that a significant stock market jump will follow the 
filing of the Schedule 13-D (probably an abnormal return of 7% 
or so).  But those trading on this information do not violate U.S. 
law, because they owe no fiduciary duty to Widget Corp.  Simi-
larly, if at a later point the Mars Fund approaches other activ-
ists to support it in its proxy campaign to add three directors to 
the Widget board, the same conclusion follows: no fiduciary 
duty is owed to Widget—hence no liability. 
But the issues become more complex once Mars success-
fully appoints two directors to Widget’s board.  Now, the direc-
tors do owe a fiduciary duty to Widget and any material, 
nonpublic information that Mars receives from them (directly 
or indirectly) makes Mars a potential tippee who is barred from 
trading.  Traditionally, from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dirks v. SEC,113 to the Second Circuit’s decision in United 
States v. Newman,114 it was necessary for the prosecution to 
113 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
114 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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show that the tipper received some “personal benefit” from (or 
on behalf of) the tippee.  This burden could often be easily 
satisfied as an evidentiary matter.  For example, if Mars pays a 
salary to its employees and asks them to sit on the Widget 
board, this should suffice to constitute the requisite “personal 
benefit.”  Even if Mars pays nothing to outside experts it may 
still have caused them to receive a director’s salary from Widget 
and this too may suffice. 
But suppose Mars does not trade Widget shares.  Instead, 
another hedge fund, Jupiter Fund, hears indirectly what the 
Mars employee on the Widget board learned at the last board 
meeting.  Jupiter has paid nothing to the Mars’ employee, but it 
arguably has received a gift of this information from an insider. 
If so, Jupiter may have liability.  But if the information now 
leaks from Jupiter to other funds who do not know the origins 
of the material information, this may be beyond the effective 
reach of the SEC or the criminal justice system. 
The prosecutor’s burden in proving insider trading has 
been substantially simplified by a recent Second Circuit deci-
sion, United States v. Martoma,115 which finds that a “gift” of 
information made by a tipper to any tippee violates the law, 
even if no “benefit” is given by the tippee to the tipper, so long 
as the tipper intends to benefit the tippee.  Although this deci-
sion would still seemingly require that the recipient of the infor-
mation know that the gift was given in breach of a fiduciary or 
similar duty by the tipper, it does not require that there be any 
115 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017) amended and superseded by 894 F.3d 64 (2d 
Cir. 2018).  In its first Martoma decision, the panel majority gave the example of a 
corporate insider who “instead of giving a cash end-of-year gift to his doorman, 
gives a tip of inside information with instructions to trade on the information.” 
Martoma, 869 F.3d at 70.  The court added: “Thus, we hold that an insider or 
tipper personally benefits from a disclosure of inside information whenever the 
information was disclosed with the expectation that the recipient would trade on 
it[.]” Id. (quotation omitted).  In the context of one hedge fund (or an employee 
thereof) tipping another, this test would seem to be easily satisfied unless there 
was some credible reason to believe that the tippee would not trade.  Then, in 
June 2018, the Martoma panel substituted a revised decision (still split on the 
same 2–1 basis), which changed the governing test.  United States v. Martoma, 
894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018).  Now, the standard for whether an unlawful gift had 
been made shifts from whether the tipper expected that the tippee would trade on 
the information to whether the tipper intended to benefit the tippee. See id. at 83. 
This change may be more semantic than substantive because a jury can easily 
find that the tipper was “intending to benefit” even a casual friend.  Also, the case 
of a tip from an insider to his condo’s doorman at Christmas (which the first 
Martoma decision said would violate Rule 10b-5) would now likely violate both the 
personal benefit standard (because the insider escapes the need to make a pecu-
niary payment to the doorman) and the gift standard. 
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“meaningful close relationship” between the tipper and the tip-
pee (as other Circuits have required).116 
Although the prosecutor’s burden has been simplified by 
Martoma, it remains true that, as the chain of tippees length-
ens, enforcement becomes more difficult and, eventually, im-
possible.  At some point, remote tippees do not know the source 
of the information or any facts suggesting a breach of duty. 
Also, the director/tipper may have had legitimate reasons for 
disclosing the information, first to the hedge fund employing 
the tipper and possibly even to its allies.  If so, this employee 
has neither violated Rule 10b-5 nor aided and abetted anyone’s 
trading violation—as, for example, in a case where the em-
ployee/director was intending only to discuss the next tactical 
moves with the rest of the hedge fund’s management team.  In 
this light, we cannot safely conclude that the increased “leaki-
ness” surrounding companies with hedge fund employees on 
their boards necessarily implies that unlawful insider trading 
has occurred.  Nevertheless, the widened bid/ask spread is an 
agency cost (as is the possibility that premature disclosure may 
cost the company in other ways). 
The relevant question thus raised is whether there is a 
feasible way to reduce this agency cost.  In our view, simple 
means to this end are available, including, as we next discuss, 
by expanding the concept of “group” under the Williams Act. 
2. Redefining “Group”.  A word of background is initially 
necessary.  A driving force behind hedge fund activism is the 
ability of a “wolf pack” of like-minded investors to assemble 
quickly to threaten (or undertake) a proxy campaign.  If all the 
members of the “wolf pack” were deemed to constitute a 
“group” under Section 13(d)(3) of the Williams Act, the process 
of “wolf pack” formation would need to slow, some current 
members would likely refuse to join the group, and other share-
116 Newman had required a “meaningfully close personal relationship” to trig-
ger the gift theory.  United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014). 
Both Martoma decisions have disagreed, finding that the tippee need not have 
such a relationship with the tipper.  This change will certainly facilitate the prose-
cution of information exchanges among hedge funds or their employees.  All the 
prosecutor will need to show is that there was an intention to benefit on the part of 
the tipper (or, under the personal benefit theory, that the tipper expected some 
reciprocal benefit in return).  Other circuits, however, may still require that there 
be a “meaningfully close personal relationship.” See, e.g., United States v. Bray, 
853 F.3d 18, 26–27 (1st Cir. 2017) (“good friends”); United States v. Parigian, 824 
F.3d 5, 16 (1st Cir. 2016) (friendship and quid pro quo); SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 
1263, 1280 (11th Cir. 2003) (“a friend and frequent partner in real estate deals”). 
Even if other Circuits do continue to require some form of “meaningfully close 
personal relationship,” this is not a high standard (and it may have existed be-
tween the tipper and the tippee on the facts of Martoma). 
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holders could enter the negotiations with the issuer to suggest 
other board candidates.  On the face of the SEC’s rules under 
the Williams Act, courts could find in many cases that an infor-
mal association of activist investors was a “group,”117 but re-
cent judicial decisions have defined “group” narrowly, refusing 
to treat activist investors who were discussing parallel action to 
constitute a group.118  Even a joint slate of directors proposed 
by the same investors has not sufficed to convince at least one 
court to deem this association of investors a “group.”119  Curi-
ously, earlier decisions had found a “group” whenever investors 
“reached an understanding to act in concert.”120  What ex-
plains this judicial shift?  Possibly, some recent courts have 
been reluctant to change the balance of advantage in a take-
over battle and did not wish to enjoin a lucrative tender offer 
over an arguably minor disclosure violation. 
Today, however, the issue is not whether courts should 
block a tender offer because of a possible disclosure shortcom-
ing, but whether an activist-led minority of the shares can 
assemble a block without disclosure and thereby preempt the 
preferences of the more passive majority.  In such a context, 
courts should be more sensitive to the likelihood that persons 
acting in concert have not had to disclose their identities, 
plans, and stock positions at the time they begin to pressure 
the board.  For example, assume that these hedge funds, each 
owning 3% of the target’s stock, decide to pressure the target to 
increase its financial leverage and spin off a third of its assets. 
If their decision to act in concert made them a group, they 
would be required to file a joint Schedule 13-D, acknowledging 
117 Particular attention needs to be given here to Rule 13d-5(b)(1) (“Acquisition 
of securities”), which provides as follows: 
When two or more persons agree to act together for the purpose of 
acquiring, holding, voting, or disposing of equity securities of an 
issuer, the group formed thereby shall be deemed to have acquired 
beneficial ownership, for purposes of Sections 13(d) and 13(g) of the 
Act, as of the date of such agreement, of all equity securities of that 
issuer beneficially owned by any such persons. 
17 C.F.R. 240.13d-5(b)(1) (2018).  This rule recognizes the possibility of a “voting 
group”—persons who have agreed to act together, for example, to elect one or 
more directors. 
118 See Hallwood Realty Partners v. Gotham Partners, 286 F.3d 613 (2d Cir. 
2002). 
119 See meVC Draper Fisher Jurvetson Fund I, Inc. v. Millennium Partners, 
260 F. Supp. 2d 616, 631–33 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
120 See, e.g., Wellman v. Dickinson, 682 F.2d 355, 363 (2d Cir. 1982) (finding 
that concerted action need not be expressly memorialized in writing to support a 
finding of a “group”); GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971) 
(finding that four shareholders who together owned 10.25% of outstanding shares 
and agreed to pool their shares constituted a “group”). 
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that they were a group and disclosing their plans.  But if they 
can avoid becoming a “group” simply by declaring that they all 
planned to act independently, then a Schedule 13-D filing 
would not be required until one of the three crossed the five 
percent threshold of Section 13(d). 
This timing difference is important because earlier notice 
would give a greater opportunity for other investors (such as 
SSGA and other diversified institutional investors) to organize 
and participate in the negotiations with the issuer.  In contrast, 
in the takeover context, earlier notice only gave the target more 
time to activate its defenses or seek a white knight. 
Even under the narrow view of “group” used by more recent 
judicial decisions, there is far more reason to find that a 
“group” exists when the activists are planning (or threatening) 
a proxy contest.  Proxy contests, by definition, require collective 
action.  In contrast, those who simply buy a target’s stock in 
the hopes that there will be a future takeover bid are not acting 
collectively (even if they regularly communicate).  Thus, those 
who discuss the possibility of asking management to appoint 
their nominees to the board (with the inherent threat in the 
background that they will start a proxy contest if rebuffed) 
seem more properly considered a “group” than those investors 
who simply purchase the stock and hope that there will be a 
takeover bid.  Put simply, because the former need to act col-
lectively to succeed, they are more appropriately deemed a 
“group.” 
Nonetheless, the narrow definition of “group” in recent 
cases poses a problem.  The best answer to this problem would 
be a new SEC rule, defining the term “group” in the context of 
hedge fund activism.  One possible articulation of such an ex-
panded rule would define a “group” to include: 
Any association in fact of persons or entities, formal or infor-
mal, that is seeking to appoint directors to the corporation’s 
board, whether through private negotiations or a proxy con-
test, which was formed prior to the public disclosure of the 
campaign or effort, including any person who has received 
information or plans, directly or indirectly, with respect to 
this effort from another group member (or any employee or 
agent thereof) and who subsequently purchased stock of 
such corporation prior to such public disclosure.121 
121 Thus, any person or entity contacted by the lead activist prior to the filing 
of its Schedule 13-D would be deemed a member of this group, if it purchased any 
shares in the target after that point.  No formal acceptance (nor any formal rejec-
tion) would count if there were share purchases by the putative group member 
after this tip and before public disclosure. 
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This “group” would include all shareholders who pur-
chased the issuer’s stock after receiving such a private tip from 
any other group member.  This standard accomplishes two 
things at once: first, it would exclude the public shareholder 
who only learns from press reports or news media that activists 
are seeking to advance a slate of board nominees.  Such people, 
even if they strongly support the slate, were not part of the 
group that organized the campaign.  Second, this standard 
places considerable weight on the private tipping of information 
by an activist to its allies; this is what fuels the “wolf pack” and 
thus should define the group.  Tips do not occur randomly; 
they are made to those whose support and loyalty is sought. 
When the lead activist tells other hedge funds (or other activ-
ists) that it is planning to file a Schedule 13-D next week with 
respect to Widget Corp., this is not idle gossip.  Rather, this is 
an informal invitation to join the “group,” and the law should so 
recognize. 
If those who receive such a tip and then purchase the 
target’s stock were deemed to be members of a Section 13(d) 
group, the consequence of using the fact of a tip from one 
activist to another as evidence of a group’s formation would be 
that the existence of the “wolf pack” would have to be disclosed 
at a much earlier stage.  Presumably, the Schedule 13-D would 
have to be amended as each additional member “joined” the 
“wolf pack.”  This idea has at least occurred to the SEC.122 
Some investors would not want to join the “group” (possibly for 
fear of liability), but this would only mean that they could not 
buy the target’s shares (at least prior to the public disclosure of 
the “group” on the filing of the Schedule 13-D).  Also, any 
poison pill that the target’s board adopts in response to this 
disclosure would likely restrict all the “group” members, hold-
ing them to their current disclosed stake.  In short, the “wolf 
pack” could less easily grow to the size it has reached in some 
recent cases.  Any proxy contest would likely be a closer battle 
122 The SEC has recently begun to suggest that collaborative sharing by the 
hedge funds of information about a campaign aimed at a specific target could 
“cross the line” and result in the formation of a “group.” See Perrie Michael 
Weiner & Patrick Hunnius, Activist Investors—Brace Yourselves for 13D Changes, 
LAW360 (Apr. 17, 2014, 10:03 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/529294/ 
activist-investors-brace-yourself-for-13d-changes [https://perma.cc/S3P4-
KWPK]; Liz Hoffman, Aruna Viswanatha & David Benoit, SEC Probes Activist 
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and other shareholders might petition the board to support 
their nominees instead. 
Is there any chance that the SEC would adopt such an 
expanded definition of “group”?  It fits easily within the statu-
tory language and it is consistent with the existing rules, but in 
recent years the SEC has stood mutely on the sidelines in the 
battles between companies and the activists engaging them. 
This neutrality may have been in part the product of the SEC’s 
knowledge that it would take much criticism from either the 
corporate community or the institutional investor community if 
it sided with the other. But there is now evidence that activism 
is associated with informed trading, a traditional focus of SEC 
enforcement.  Also, the debate over activist tactics is no longer 
simply a two-sided battle between activist funds and target 
managements, as the institutional investor community is itself 
divided (with activists on one side and the “permanent” share-
holder community—i.e., BlackRock, SSGA and Vanguard—on 
the other).  By ignoring the “wolf pack,” the SEC is increasingly 
playing the ostrich and rendering itself irrelevant. 
3. Disclosure About Confidentiality Restrictions.  In our data 
set, the majority of the settlement agreements did not set forth 
any provision regarding the sharing of the information learned 
by the hedge fund’s nominees at board meetings, while other 
settlement agreements only referred to a separate confidential-
ity agreement whose terms were not disclosed.123  Yet our data 
also shows that the market responds much more positively to 
the announcement of a settlement agreement with an explicit 
restriction on information sharing.124  This suggests that such 
information is material to investors.125  Hence, given the fre-
quency with which such settlement agreements are filed, the 
SEC could indicate that it wants greater disclosure (whether in 
the Form 8-K or in a press release) about the handling of confi-
dential information acquired by the new fund-nominated 
directors. 
123 See supra notes 53–56 and accompanying text. 
124 See supra Table 9.  The five-day CAR was 2.25% for settlement agreements 
with a restriction on information sharing versus 0.42% for those without such a 
restriction. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
125 Beginning with TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976), 
the Supreme Court has consistently defined “materiality” by finding that: “An 
omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable 
shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” Id. at 439. 
When the omission of any reference to a confidentiality provision seems to move 
the market across a wide range of cases (as our data shows), that omission is 
material. 
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This need for fuller disclosure stems in part from the fact 
that slates of directors sponsored by a hedge fund is both a new 
phenomenon and a rapidly growing one.  Also, under Regula-
tion FD, the issuer may not selectively disclose material infor-
mation to a hedge fund, unless it has obtained a confidentiality 
agreement.126  All these factors support the case for requiring 
disclosure of the presence or absence of a confidentiality provi-
sion and its terms. 
3. Impact and Possible Rebuttals 
The proposals made here will not stop or cripple hedge 
fund activism.  Nor is that their intent.  Still, they should re-
duce tipping and informed trading, and they would authorize 
the other shareholders to take self-help measures.  These are 
modest goals that reduce the agency costs associated with 
hedge fund activism.  They increase transparency and share-
holder rights, but they do not chill activism. 
Nonetheless, we anticipate rebuttals from the proponents 
of activism.  They may argue that the losses from widened 
spreads and informed trading are small in relation to the gains 
from activism. Two serious problems surround such an argu-
ment: First, the gains from activism are in dispute, and the 
existing empirical studies prove only that there is a positive 
stock price reaction at the time the activists file their original 
Schedule 13-D announcing their position and later if there is a 
“successful outcome.”127  Absent a successful outcome (such 
as a takeover or acquisition of the target), stock prices tend not 
to rise further.128  Second and more important, this justifica-
tion that the gains exceed the losses is an unfortunate example 
of an “end-justifies-the-means” argument, which should be 
viewed skeptically, particularly when the conduct is unlawful. 
The evidence collected in this Article strongly implies that in-
formed trading is systematically occurring after the appoint-
ment of fund-nominated directors, and in light of the recent 
case law, this behavior is likely to be unlawful if the tipper is 
126 Under Rule 100(b)(2) of Regulation FD, the prohibition against selective 
disclosure in Rule 100(a) does not apply to a disclosure “[t]o a person who ex-
pressly agrees to maintain the disclosed information in confidence.” See 17 C.F.R. 
§243.100(b)(2)(ii) (2018). 
127 See discussion at supra note 1; see also Becht et al., supra note 100, at 31 
(reporting results from a large international survey and concluding that the 
“[s]uccess of the activist business model appears to crucially depend on the ac-
tivist achieving outcomes.”  In other words, the appointment of activist directors 
does not alone create value.). 
128 See Becht et al., supra note 100, at 28–31 (activist engagements without a 
successful outcome do not create shareholder value). 
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seeking to benefit the tippee.129  To suggest that this behavior 
should be ignored to facilitate activism is to suggest that perva-
sive criminal conduct is tolerable if it is profitable.  The modern 
history of Wall Street provides ample evidence that once the 
rules are recurrently bent or ignored, full scale corruption soon 
follows.130 
A more modest variant on this initial claim that informa-
tion sharing leads to greater benefits than costs is the narrower 
claim that information sharing does not violate the director’s 
duty of confidentiality under Delaware Law.131  To a degree, 
this may be true, and a respected Delaware Vice Chancellor 
has argued in a well-known law review article that fund-nomi-
nated directors may share confidential information with the 
activist fund that nominated them.132  But even this Article, 
which reads the somewhat ambiguous precedents very permis-
sively, recognizes that the sharing must stop there and the 
activist fund cannot then share with others.133  We would go 
further and argue that the director may only share confidential 
information with the activist fund if the director reasonably 
believes that adequate restrictions are in place at the fund to 
ensure confidentiality.  As our study shows, such formal poli-
cies are uncommon.134  Moreover, unlike private equity firms 
(which hold stakes in unlisted companies whose securities 
cannot be traded), the activist fund lives in an environment 
where many will be seeking confidential information from it. 
Absent strong policies and internal controls, the result of al-
lowing directors to share with the fund that employs them may 
be continued informed trading.  In such an environment, a 
129 See supra notes 102, 110, 111 and accompanying text (discussing United 
States v. Martoma, under which even gifts of information to casual friends or 
acquaintances can seemingly be prosecuted if there is an intent to benefit the 
tippee). 
130 This is also the theme of “Junk,” a play by Ayad Akhtar, a Pulitzer Prize-
winning dramatist, which focuses on the M&A world of the 1980’s and seems 
loosely based on the career of Michael Milken.  Terry Teachout, ‘Junk’ Review: 
Bankrupting Entertainment, WALL  ST. J. (Nov. 2, 2017, 8:30 PM), https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/junk-review-bankrupting-entertainment-1509669000 
[https://perma.cc/YEW3-78BJ]. 
131 Delaware has long recognized that the director owes a duty of confidential-
ity. See Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125, 129 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
132 See Laster & Zeberkiewicz, supra note 43, at 50. 
133 Id. at 55 (“The corporation can also require the director’s affiliate to enter 
into a confidentiality agreement that restricts the use or further dissemination of 
the information.”). 
134 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text (finding that few corpora-
tions in our data set appeared to impose meaningful restrictions).  This failure 
may be, of course, in part a product of management’s limited leverage with respect 
to powerful activists and strong risk aversion. 
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director cannot assume confidentiality. Sharing of confidential 
information by the director with the hedge fund that nominated 
it should be permissible only when the director has first taken 
steps to assure himself or herself that adequate policies are in 
place to assure confidentiality. 
CONCLUSION 
Informed trading is closely associated with hedge fund ac-
tivism, but the mechanism underlying information leakage is 
unclear.  It is far too cynical to conclude that everyone does it. 
Most do not.  Our most striking finding is that there is a radical 
difference in behavior between fund-nominated directors who 
are business executives and those who are hedge fund employ-
ees.  Different norms and moralities (or, at least, different op-
portunities) appear to separate these two populations.  Once a 
hedge fund employee goes on the board, informed trading is the 
norm, not the exception.  We do not argue that all activist funds 
are alike or that they all engage in such behavior; nor do we 
assert that activist funds (or their employees) are trading on 
insider information.  It is possible that some tipping is a cynical 
exchange of a tip for an expected reciprocal favor in the future. 
But it is also possible that the more common phenomenon is 
simply casual gossip among professionals in close contact.  At 
a minimum, we are convinced that the informational parti-
tions, if any, between the activist fund and its allies tend to be 
porous. 
In turn, this implies both that an agency cost is imposed on 
the other shareholders and that activism is receiving a subsidy 
in the form of pervasive access to material, nonpublic informa-
tion.  We do not claim that this subsidy alone fuels hedge fund 
activism, but it likely does inflate the number of engagements 
and may make otherwise economically marginal hedge fund 
interventions profitable. 
What reforms are justified?  One might hope that sunlight 
is the best disinfectant and thus that the mere announcement 
of our findings would lead activists both toward preferring 
outside experts to their own employees as proposed directors 
and into installing stronger controls protecting confidentiality. 
Nice as it may be to think so, we are not optimistic that reform 
will follow automatically from the announcement of our find-
ings.  In part, this is because the fund’s nominated employee is 
often the fund’s founder, and in part, it is because the activist 
fund may need to reward its allies in order to maintain its 
coalition and thus its leverage for any approaching proxy fight. 
456 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:381 
Because we find the dominant pattern to be that the hedge 
fund and the target company do not specify any confidentiality 
restrictions on the information acquired by the fund’s director 
nominees, we think this might be the first area for the SEC to 
address.  Encouraging stronger confidentiality provisions in 
settlement agreements (and disclosing their absence) might 
curb the ease with which private information seems to flow. 
Our proposed reforms will hardly cripple hedge fund activ-
ism, but they could reduce a perverse subsidy.  We recognize 
that activist funds should be able to reap the gains if the stock 
prices of their target firms rise after their intervention, but not 
if prices fall or just fluctuate erratically. We anticipate that our 
reforms will face resistance, but we see no sound justification 
for tolerating pervasive information leakage. 
Finally, our findings supply a road map for regulators. To 
date, the prosecution of insider trading has proceeded on an ad 
hoc, case-by-case basis that is dependent upon enforcers for-
tuitously stumbling upon a violation (often as the result of 
whistleblowers or plea bargains with third parties who are re-
warded for confessing as to other violations).  But, using our 
approach, regulators could identify suspicious patterns of in-
formation leakage and then could turn to the options market to 
learn who was trading.  That would substitute rational search 
for happenstance. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
EMPIRICAL APPENDIX 
In Appendix Figure 1, the x-axis is the number of days 
between the director’s appointment date and the Form 8-K fil-
ing.  This normalization by the “time difference” allows for plot-
ting leakage for Form 8-K filings from different points in time 
on the same figure.  We average the leakage by treatment and 
control group for each “time difference” and apply 
nonparametric smoothing piecewise to the pre- and post- peri-
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APPENDIX FIGURE 1.  PARALLEL TRENDS.  This Figure plots pre and 
post-time trends on the leakage outcome for the treatment and 
control groups (chosen by propensity score matching).  The x-
axis is the number of days between the director appointment 
date and the Form 8-K filing.  This normalization by the “time 
difference” allows for plotting leakage for Form 8-K filings from 
different points in time on the same figure.  We average the 
leakage by treatment and control group for each “time 
difference” and apply piecewise nonparametric kernel 
regression to the pre- and post- periods for each group.  The 
treatment group is plotted with a solid line, while the control 
group is plotted with a dotted line in the Figure below. 
As Appendix Figure 1 shows, trends in leakage over time for 
our treatment and control groups are parallel prior to the date 
of the activist director.  We observe a shift in those trends only 
after the appointment of the activist director. 
THEORETICAL APPENDIX 
In this Appendix, we explain why, strictly as a theoretical 
matter, activist investors and target boards might pursue set-
tlement agreements that facilitate access to, and trading upon, 
material nonpublic information.  We show that expected profits 
from insider trading induce lower-quality activists to engage in 
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intervention campaigns than otherwise would, and that the 
social costs of such informed trading imply a divergence be-
tween the private and socially optimal level of activist quality. 
We begin with the framework in Burkart and Lee, which 
considers the payoffs to activism.135  In their model, the ac-
tivist’s campaign succeeds with probability q(ea) ∝ saqaea, where 
sa ∈ (0,1) is the proportion of shares the activist holds at the 
conclusion of the campaign, qa ≥ 0 denotes the activist’s ability, 
ea ≥ 0 denotes her effort.2  Firm value after a successful activist 
campaign is given by V(ea) = q(ea)pm, i.e., increasing in the 
probability of success.  The activist incurs an effort cost given 
by: 
Although for concision we omit the technical assumptions 
set out in Burkart and Lee, we briefly restate the sequence of 
the game they consider. The activist begins with a “toehold” 
investment in the company, ta ∈ (0,1) fraction of shares. At t = -
3, the activist purchases ra shares at the open-market price pa. 
At t = −2, the activist chooses whether to engage in an interven-
tion, and if so, what effort level ea to expend.  At t = −1, upon the 
successful sale of the firm, the activist receives saV(ea), i.e., her 
share of the value of the firm, which is a function of the effort 
exerted at t = −2. 
Like Burkart and Lee, we require that pa ≥ V (ea), i.e., the 
activist is unable to acquire shares on the open market at a 
price lower than the ex-post expected value, which is essen-
tially the free-rider problem identified in Grossman and Hart.3 
We also impose the incentive constraint that saV’(ea) = K’(ea), 
i.e., the activist will optimally expend effort until marginal cost 
is equal to marginal gains. 
Next, we augment Burkart and Lee by assuming that the 
activist also receives a payoff equal to the expected value of 
engaging in illegal insider trading on the basis of information 
obtained through access to the corporate boardroom after a 
1 Following Burkart and Lee, we adopt the simplifying assumption that the 
activist seeks to intervene in order to sell the firm to a third-party bidder. See 
Mike Burkart and Samuel Lee, Activism and Takeovers, https://papers.SSRN. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2585836 [https://perma.cc/ARL8-DNQ8]. 
2 Unlike Burkart and Lee, we do not explicitly parameterize voting rights and 
implicitly embrace a rule of one-share, one-vote. 
3 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free Rider Prob-
lem and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42 (1980).  One motivation 
for this constraint is that, as noted above, federal law mandates disclosure when 
block holders, including activist shareholders, exceed 5% ownership. 
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settlement agreement.  We adopt the notation used in Mc-
Crary,4 which implies that the activist’s problem is given by: 
Subject to: max saV(ea) − K(ea) − rapa + Et[V(Bt+1)] 
pa ≥ V(ea) 
saV’(ea) = K’(ea) 
sa = ta + ra 
The term Et[V(Bt+1)] refers to the expected value of the future 
benefit of insider trading from boardroom access in the dy-
namic recursive model of McCrary.  For present purposes, we 
consider the simple case where the expected utility from engag-
ing in insider trading is independent of the number of shares 
acquired.  In that case, the solution to the optimization prob-
lem is unaffected and the result in Burkart and Lee applies: 
.  And, as in their model, there exists a unique qa such 
that the activist will engage in the intervention if and only if her 
qa ≥ qa.  But we expect qa to decrease with Et[V(Bt+1)]: that is, that 
as insider-trading profits rise, the activist ability necessary to 
justify an intervention falls.5 
Now, let’s consider more carefully the term Et[V(Bt+1)], or the 
expected value of future gains from insider trading, following 
McCrary. In that model, the activist is presented each period 
with a (random) benefit of insider trading, denoted by Bt+1, 
which has c.d.f. F(.).  Apprehension occurs with probability pt+1. 
For now, we adopt the simplifying assumption that the penalty 
for insider trading is a single-period punishment c, which is 
deterministic and constant over time.  In each period, the ac-
tivist is presented with the opportunity Bt+1.  If she chooses to 
commit the crime and is not apprehended, she receives the 
expected payoff dEt[V(Bt+2)] + Bt+1, where d is the discount factor. 
If apprehended, she receives the expected payoff dEt[V(Bt+2)] − c. 
If she does not engage in crime, she receives the flow utility 
dEt[V(Bt+2)]. The director’s problem is to maximize the recursive 
value function: 
V(Bt+1) = max{dEt[V(Bt+2)], pt(dEt[V(Bt+2)] − c) + (1 − pt) (dEt[V(Bt+2)] + 
Bt+1])}. 
4 Justin McCrary, Dynamic Perspectives on Crime, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECO-
NOMICS OF CRIME (Bruce L. Benson & Paul R. Zimmerman, eds. 2010). 
5 The optimal effort is easily calculated (see Burkart and Lee supra note 1) as 
, implying that the activist’s expected profit is given by: 
.  For this 
expression to be positive, a larger Et[V(Bt+1)] admits a smaller value of qa. 
Et[VCBt+1)] = 8Et[VCBt+2)] + (1- F(b;+1))(l - Trt+1)Et[Bt+1 -
h;+1 IBt+1 - h;+1 > 0] 




1 + exp(-vt) 
1 
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The solution is obtained via a “reservation benefit” such 
that for any , the director facilitates insider trading, 
and otherwise does not.6  Straightforward substitution yields 
, 
and the reservation benefit is given by , which is 
very similar to the result found in the static Becker model.7 
We derive the optimal stopping time for the facilitation of 
illicit trading.  Suppose that Bt+1] is uniformly distributed over 
the interval [0, 1] and the probability of detection is given by a 
standard logistic function of the square root of time: 
It is plausible to assume that the probability of detection 
increases with time because it is easier for prosecutors to de-
tect and establish illegal insider trading as the number of 
trades and abnormal profit increases.  It might seem that the 
probability of detection does not necessarily increase with time, 
but rather with the number of trades; however, in this simpli-
fied model, it is a reasonable approximation, as the agent either 
“trades or not” and the periods of no-trading do not decrease 
the probability of detection.  With these assumptions, it is 
straightforward to substitute: 
which allows for a straightforward determination of a maxi-
mum stopping time such that for any , we have that 
. Suppose, for example, that the punishment c = 
0.1. Then and at . 
However, it is generally better for the director to stop before 
this time .  Substituting in the value function 
yields, for any period where (of course, for 
any period where , we have that 
:8 
6 See McCrary, supra note 4, for a straightforward derivation of this recur-
sive expected value.  We normalize the flow utility to zero, assuming that the 
activist’s profit is given entirely by the benefit Bt+1. 
7 Gary Becker, A Theory of Social Interactions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1063 (1974). 
8 Recall that F(Bt+1) = Bt+1 in this simple setting. 
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Recall that , which leads to: 
Note that the second term is approximately the derivative 
of the cumulative value function with respect to time.  For 
, the optimal stopping time is simply the first-order 
condition: 
In general, it will be the case that Consider, again, the 
example where c = 0.1 , which yields an optimal stopping time 
of t* ≡ 2.59. Letting d = 0.99, the cumulative expected value for 
the upcoming time period is given by: 
Time Period 
t=1 0.05952391  0.73 
t=2 0.07584117  0.80 
t=3 0.06689266  0.84 
t=4 0.04168107  0.88 
t=5  0.005558258 0.90 
APPENDIX TABLE 1: EXPECTED PAYOFF BY STOPPING TIME 
As the Appendix Table 1 shows, the activist’s expected pay-
off is indeed maximized by stopping at t = 2 rather than t = 5. 
That is: consistent with the empirical findings described in 
r-1 .! - cevt+l 
27 ~ 2 
E[fl(0a, r)] = 0J 32k tdP~ - k + L 8Et[VCBt+2)] + 1 + evt+l 
t=O r-l (1 vt+l) --ce 
_ 2 E._ 4 2 _ k + 0 t 2 E[fl(0a, r)] - 0a 32k taPm _ ~ 1 + evt+l 
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subpart II.A, an activist director may be better off facilitating 
trading for shorter rather than longer periods of time. 
Moreover, Et[V(Bt+1)] at t = 0 will be positive only if the stop-
ping time is chosen correctly.  Assuming that the director can 
facilitate profitable insider trading, then, yields a smaller value 
of qa in the Burkart and Lee model—that is, permits lower-
quality activists to intervene in public company governance 
than otherwise would. 
It might be tempting to conclude that such conduct, 
whether or not legally sanctioned, is likely to be social welfare-
enhancing.  Indeed, in the Burkurt and Lee  model, social wel-
fare would seem to be strictly enhanced by greater activist par-
ticipation regardless of activist ability, because firm value, V(ea) 
= saqaeapm, is strictly increasing in qa.  On this view, the direc-
tor’s access to insider trading opportunities essentially serve as 
a subsidy for more value-enhancing activism (or, if one prefers, 
compensation for the activist’s socially valuable work).  But it 
does not necessarily follow that the private optimum is identi-
cal to the social optimum because of an externality of the in-
sider trading: wider bid-ask spreads. 
Glosten and Putnins argue that informed trading generates 
welfare losses by leading to wider bid-ask spreads.9  One way to 
formalize this idea is to suppose that the social cost of informed 
trading can be represented as a function of t, the number of 
periods that the activist director facilitates insider trading.  In 
Glosten and Putnins, wider bid-ask spreads impose a social 
cost by preventing some mutually beneficial transactions from 
taking place—a cost society incurs in each period in which the 
insider trades.  To see the divergence between the private and 
social optimum, recall that the expected value of an activist 
intervention, which we denote as is given as follows, substitut-
ing the recursive payoff from insider trading as of time t = 0: 
As noted previously, there generally exists a t* that maxi-
mizes the last term at a positive value (unless the punishment c 
9 Lawrence R. Glosten & Talis J. Putnins, The Welfare Costs of Informed 
Trade, AM. ECON. ASS’N,  https://www.aeaweb.org/conference/2016/retrieve. 
php? pdfid=808 [https://perma.cc/HF2P-2JZG]. 
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for insider trading is so great that an activist will not engage in 
it at all).  And as a result, the minimum quality level qa such 
that for any qa > qa, E[P(qa,t)] ≥ 0, is lower than in the absence of 
insider trading opportunities. 
Letting lt denote the average, per-activist social cost im-
posed by insider trading through the stopping time t, the social 
planner’s objective function is given by: 
And by applying the same approximation as in the prior 
Subsection, the first-order condition with respect to t is given 
by: 
It is straightforward to see that t* Social < t* for all c > 0. As 
the expected value of insider trading increases with t, there 
exists a range of values of qa for which it is privately, but not 
socially optimal to engage in activism, i.e., E[P(qa,t)] > 0 but 
E[PSocial(qa,t)] < 0.  In Appendix Figure 1, we plot E[P(qa,t)] and 
E[PSocial(qa,t)] as a function of qa at the optimal stopping times t* 
and qSocial, respectively, and show the divergence between the 
socially and privately optimal levels of activist quality.10 
In sum, we theorize that the payoffs to shareholder activ-
ism can include profits related to directors’ facilitation of trad-
ing on material nonpublic information, and that directors can 
recursively determine the optimal amount of such activity in 
light of the probability of detection.  Those profits, in turn, de-
crease the level of activist quality necessary to justify the mar-
ginally viable activist intervention.  And, while such profits 
might reflect compensation for socially productive activism in 
the style of Manne (1965), since the trading that produces 
those profits can result in widened bid-ask spreads, and since 
the costs related to widening spreads are not internalized by 
10 In Figure 1, for simplicity parameter values are set at c = 0.1, ta = 0.1, pm = 
1, k = 3, k = 1, and l = 4. The example in the Figure is solely for illustrative 
purposes; the actual divergence, if any, between the social and private optimum 
depends on the range of these parameters. 
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the activist,11 there is the potential for a divergence in the 
socially and privately optimal level of activist quality. 
APPENDIX  FIGURE 1.  PRIVATELY  OPTIMAL VS. SOCIALLY  OPTIMAL 
ACTIVIST  QUALITY  RANGE.  This figure shows the range of the 
activist quality parameter qa and the resulting expected value 
to activism, after choosing the optimal stopping time t* as 
described in subpart II.B, for the private vs. socially optimal 
maximization problems.  The two expected-value calculations 
are given by: 
Other parameters are set at c = 0.1, ta = 0.1, pm = 1, k = 3, k 
= 1, and l = 4.  The red shaded region shows the range of 
activist quality parameter qa that yield a positive expected value 
of activism for the activist but a negative expected value to the 
social planner. 
11 Of course, to the extent that the activist seeks to liquidate their position, 
the bid-ask spread might be relevant to the activist’s private costs (Though we 
note in this respect that, unlike many shareholders, activists often prefer control 
to liquidity (compare John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional 
Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991) (finding institutional 
investors prefer liquidity to control), with Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge 
Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021 
(2007) (finding that hedge funds’ intense activism necessitates less diversification 
and liquidity than institutional investors)).  More importantly for present pur-
poses, however, even these privately internalized costs to the activist are unlikely 
to be equal to the costs to the investing public imposed by widened bid-ask 
spreads.  Our claim is not that the activist internalizes zero costs of the trading 



















125 150 175 
Activist Quality 
20 0 
! ! Privately Optimal! ! Socially Optimal 
225 
466 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 104:381 
